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ADDRESSING SEGREGATION IN THE BROWN COLLAR
WORKPLACE: TOWARD A SOLUTION FOR THE
INEXORABLE 100%
Leticia M. Saucedo*
Despite public perception to the contrary, segregated workplaces exist in greater
number today than ever before, largely because of the influx of newly arrived im-
migrant workers to low-wage industries throughout the country. Yet existing anti-
discrimination frameworks no longer operate adequately to rid workplaces of the
segregation that results from targeting immigrant workers. This Article suggests a
new anti-discrimination framework to address workplace segregation. The Article
reviews how litigants have attempted to rid the workplace of conditions resulting
from segregated departments through existing anti-discrimination frameworks. It
then suggests a simple, yet powerful, shift in the inferences that can be drawn from
the inexorability of a segregated workplace. It asks the reader to imagine an infer-
ence created from the "inexorable 100, " the mirror image of the inexorable zero
inference, and a shorthand description for a segregated job category or department
within a workplace. The Article proposes a segregation framework that views segre-
gation as an expression of subordinated work conditions, and that offers courts
the opportunity to craft broader remedies, both to eliminate segregation and im-
prove the working conditions of segregated workers.
INTRODUCTION
Despite public perception to the contrary, segregated work-
places exist in greater number today than ever before, largely
because of the influx of newly arrived immigrant workers to low-
wage industries throughout the country.' These "brown collar"
workplaces, like segregated workplaces of the past, are often ex-
ploitive and dead end. The same discriminatory practices that
exclude native-born workers from segregated workplaces target
* Associate Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Ve-
gas. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1996. I thank the following people who gave me ideas and
who commented on earlier drafts of this Article: Raquel Aldana, Annette Appell, Mary
Berkheiser, Robert Correales, Lynne Henderson, Kate Kruse, Ann McGinley, Elaine Shoben,
and David Thronson. I also wish to thank the participants of the LatCrit XI workshop, and
the William S. Boyd School of Law faculty workshop, who challenged some of the ideas put
forth in this Article. My research assistant, Judy Cox, provided excellent research assistance.
I owe much gratitude to my dean, John V. White, former dean Richard Morgan, the gener-
ous supporters of the William S. Boyd School of Law, and the Boyd faculty community, for
their complete support and encouragement of the writing process.
I. See Rogelio Saenz et al., The United States: Immigration to the Melting Pot of the Ameri-
cas, in MIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL VIEW 211, 211-32 (Maura I. Toro-Morn &
Marixsa Alicea eds., 2004).
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immigrant workers for these less-desirable jobs.2 Yet, ironically, be-
cause 'job opportunities" are open to them, brown collar workers
are less readily recognized as discrimination victims. Brown collar
workers are what some globalization scholars term "weak winners."
In contrast to the "strong losers" who previously held these once
more-desirable jobs, the weak winners may enjoy the benefits of a
job, but they certainly do not enjoy ajob with the labor standards
that existed before it became a brown collarjob.4
In the current mythos, low-wage jobs, which are often segre-
gated, are idealized as the natural starting point for immigrant
workers entering the workforce. The myth "portrays the system as
open to those who are willing to work hard and pull themselves
over barriers of poverty and discrimination.", However, the struc-
tural aspect of segregation-the fact that it persists over time
despite legal strategies attacking it-belies the individualist narra-
tive of workers freely choosing the occupations they desire. The
endurance of segregation may also reveal the existence of a work-
place dynamic unaffected by, and out of the reach of, current anti-
discrimination law.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted partly in response to
the exploitation that accompanied segregation under Jim Crow
laws. 6 Title VII of the Act prohibits the segregation or classification
of jobs on the basis of one or more of the protected categories.7
Anti-discrimination law focuses on eliminating structural barriers
to employment opportunity or advancement. 8 Consequently, the
2. Employers carry out their preferences for brown collar workers by creating work-
place structures that are unappealing to native born workers and then hiring immigrants
into them. Some of these structures include independent contractor or other workplace
arrangements that have been stripped of traditional employee benefits arrangements. See
generally KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR
THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 158-59 (2004); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace
Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
91, 100-04 (2003); Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1894-95 (2000).
3. See SHAHRA RAZAVI, GENDERED POVERTY AND WELL-BEING 21, 249, 259-60 (2000)
(discussing women's roles in export-oriented industries which arise out of off-shore opera-
tions once operating in developed countries and analyzing the effect of such operations on
working conditions and labor standards).
4. Id. at 259-60.
5. Jennifer M. Russell, The Race/Class Conundrum and the Pursuit of Individualism in the
Making of Social Policy, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1408 (1995).
6. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 465, 471-74 (1968).
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified
as amended in pertinent part at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2004)).
8. The text of Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice to "limit, segregate,
or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
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Title VII frameworks that courts have developed-disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact-best address an employer's failure to
provide equal employment opportunities on a clearly delineated
job track. The frameworks are not adequate to target and eradicate
the overrepresentation of workers in a particular job, especially
ones as segmented and contingent as those that immigrant workers
populate.
While the current legal regime typically focuses on breaking
down barriers to entry or opportunity, Title VII also has a history of
broad remedial power over discrimination in the workplace. In
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, for example, the Supreme Court fo-
cused on the injury to formulate a remedy that would make the
plaintiffs whole. 9 The Court noted:
"[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has
been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief." ...
Where racial discrimination is concerned, "the [district] court
has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree
which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory ef-
fects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the
future."'1
This Article posits that this kind of broad remedy is necessary to
definitively dismantle modern segregation in the brown collar
workplace." With this goal, it proposes a Title VII segregation
framework, centered on recognizing a new inference of discrimi-
nation when all-or 100 percent of-workers in ajob category are
from a protected group, the "inexorable 100." The inexorable 100
is the mirror image of the "inexorable zero," an inference of dis-
crimination currently recognized by courts where there is a
complete absence of a protected group in ajob category.
origin." Id. (codified as amended in pertinent part at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2004)).
This is in part because of historical legal strategies aimed at eradicating segregated work-
places by focusing on legal structural impediments like Jim Crow laws, on the assumption
that their eradication would naturally lead to desegregation in the workplace. See Risa Lau-
ren Goluboff, "Let Economic Equality Take Care of Itself.': The NAACP, Labor Litigation, and the
Making of Civil Rights in the 1940s, 52 UCLA L. REv. 1393, 1442 (2005).
9. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975).
10. Id. at 418 (citations omitted).
11. See Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker and the Mak-
ing of the Brown Collar Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 961 (2006) (providing an explanation and
in-depth discussion of the existence, development and maintenance of the brown collar
workplace).
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There are two motivations for the exploration in this Article.
The first is the incomplete analysis of the role of immigrants in the
American workforce in both the immigration and employment dis-
crimination debates. The uni-dimensional character of the debate,
specifically the focus on immigrants alternatively taking away jobs
others want or taking jobs no one else wants, masks the subordina-
tion that often exists in the segregated workplace. 2 As noted above,
the argument assumes that no unlawful discrimination occurs as
long as immigrants have opportunities to take jobs that no one else
will take.13 It also myopically focuses on the worker's role and
choices, ignoring the employer's role in creating isolated, dead-
end jobs. The rhetoric instead presumes that these jobs are an in-
evitable part of American economic life. 14 Further, by focusing on
the employee's role, the debate draws attention away from the em-
ployer and government policies that have allowed the creation of
jobs with lower wages, no health insurance or other benefits, and
lax safety regulations.
The second purpose of this Article is to move beyond the debate
over which workers should hold which particular jobs. This debate
pits employee groups against each other in an increasingly seg-
mented labor market, engendering tensions between groups, 5 and
allowing employers to avoid liability by pointing to the segmented
nature of the market, much as employers have successfully done to
explain wage disparities.
16
Part I of this Article analyzes traditional approaches to segrega-
tion through the existing anti-discrimination frameworks. It
critiques their limited ability to eradicate segregation, as evidenced
by the continued existence of workplace segregation. Part II ana-
lyzes the effectiveness of strategies attacking segregated conditions
12. See e.g., Both Sides of the Borders: The Voice of Paul McKinley (Chi. Pub. Radio broad-
cast Aug. 21, 2006), http://www.chicagopublicradio.org/Program-848-Segment.aspx?
segmentlD=1021 (featuring ex-offender and activist Paul McKinley speaking out against
immigrants taking jobs from African Americans).
13. This assumption itself contains two further assumptions: first, that by taking these
jobs, immigrants are signaling a "preference" for them. Second, and relatedly, that the
"choice" of immigrants to take these jobs should preclude any discrimination claim. See
Saucedo, supra note 11, at 973-76.
14. Id. at 973.
15. The narrative of groups taking each others' jobs has played out in various litigation
arenas. See, e.g., EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 E2d 292 (7th Cir. 1991); Leah
Beth Ward, Global Horizons Labor Suit Granted Class-Action Status, YAKIMA HERALD-REPUBLIC,
Aug. 1, 2006.
16. See ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P. BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER INEQUALITY:
COURTS, MARKETS, AND UNEQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN IN AMERICA 49-50 (1999) (explaining




under the existing frameworks, such as wage inequity, conditions,
and national origin cases. Part III identifies the inexorable zero in
traditional anti-discrimination law as the foundational theoretical
concept for the mirror-image inexorable 100 in the modern segre-
gated environment. Part IV demonstrates why a segregation
framework is the necessary and appropriate step in anti-
discrimination law to address the segregation in the brown collar
workplace. It then suggests an anti-discrimination framework that
arises out of a view of segregation as an expression of subordinated
work conditions. The key component of this framework is the in-
exorable 100. In an ideal world, an inexorable 100 inference would
allow a judge to impose remedial measures to dismantle the segre-
gation. More importantly, recognition of an inexorable 100
concept should also open the way for a remedy that includes the
improvement of conditions in segregated occupations.
I. THE INABILITY OF CURRENT PARADIGMS TO REMEDY
SEGREGATED WORKPLACES
The argument that segregation is discriminatory is not novel, yet
courts still reject it even in traditional workplace segregation fact
patterns, as illustrated by Marion v. Slaughter Co.' 7 In Marion, a fe-
male assembler sued her employer because she was consigned to a
segregated department and did not have opportunities for ad-
vancement. 8 She attempted to show that the employer's practices
had a disparate impact on women simply by showing the fact of
segregation.' 9 The circuit court affirmed the district court's dis-
missal of her argument, stating that Title VII requires more than a
showing of the mere fact of segregation to make out a prima facie
case of discrimination.2 0 As the Marion court noted:
[T] he fact, standing alone, that [the company] has all men in
sheet metal positions and all women in assembly is not a per
se violation of Title VII; nor is it self-proving as to the exis-
tence of a policy or practice, lawful or otherwise. The section
of the statute to which the plaintiff refers ... refers to segre-
gation or classification that tends to deprive protected
individuals of employment opportunity or otherwise adversely
affect employment status. Thus, it is not the fact of separate
17. Marion v. Slaughter Co., 1999 WL 1267015 (10th Cir. 1999).
18. Id. at *2.
19. Id. at *4-5.
20. Id. at *6.
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genders in departments that is prohibited, it is the depriva-
tion of opportunity or adverse effect on status that is• • 21
prohibited.
Thus, even though Title VII prohibits the "classification or seg-
regation" of positions, as a result of the doctrinal focus on
opportunities for advancement, the disparate impact and disparate
treatment frameworks developed by the courts require more-
specifically, a showing of a deprivation of opportunity. This analysis
ignores the strong historical correlations between segregated
workplaces and inferior positions and conditions for minorities
and women. Social science research shows that the more segre-
gated the occupation, the more its employees experience wage
disparities, less desirable work tasks and assignments, and deterio-
22rating pay over time. That such conditions deserve anti-
discrimination protection is a tenet of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.25 Marion is stripped of the bedrock assumption underlying
historical segregation cases such as Brown v. Board ofEducation2 4 and
Hernandez v. Texa' and their progeny: that segregation is a per se
equal protection violation because of its subordinating aspects.
Modern cases, like Marion, rest on a new assumption of nondis-
26crimination, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Lisa Catanzarite, Occupational Context and Wage Competition of New Immigrant
Latinos with Minorities and Whites, in THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON AFRICAN AMERICANS
59, 60 (Steven Shulman ed., 2004) [hereinafter Occupational Context and Wage Competition];
Lisa Catanzarite, Dynamics of Segregation and Earnings in Brown-Collar Occupations, 29 WORK &
OCCUPATIONS 300, 301 (2002) [hereinafter Diynamics of Segregation and Earnings]; Lisa Catan-
zarite, Race-Gender Composition and Occupational Pay Degradation, 50 Soc. PROBS. 14, 17 (2003)
[hereinafter Race-Gender Composition]; Lisa Catanzarite & Michael Bernab6 Aguilera, Working
with Co-Ethnics: Earnings Penalties for Latino Immigrants at Latino Jobsites, 49 Soc. PROBS. 101,
103 (2002); Lisa Catanzarite, Wage Penalties in Brown-Collar Occupations, LATINO POLICY AND
ISSUES BRIEF NO. 8 (UCLA Chicano Studies Research Ctr., Los Angeles, Cal.), Sept. 2003,
http://www.chicano.ucla.edu/press/siteart/LPIB_08Sept2003.pdf [hereinafter Wage Penal-
ties].
23. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codi-
fied as amended in pertinent part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-17 (2004)); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1979). See also, Susan Sturm, Second
Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458, 466-68
(2001).
24. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
26. With the shift in assumptions about the relationship between segregation and dis-
crimination, many of the disparate impact cases that challenge segregation in the workplace
focus on employer practices that prohibit the advancement of protected groups from one
job or occupation to another. See e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 E3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007)
(affirming district court's grant of class certification to female employees of Wal-Mart alleg-
ing sex discrimination); Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
(admitting expert testimony in support of plaintiffs' challenge against employer's subjective
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In the past, courts have sometimes successfully addressed segre-
gated workplace issues within the disparate impact and disparate
treatment frameworks. However, as employer practices have be-
come more multi-faceted and subtle, 2' and the labor market has
changed, attacking segregation and its effects within these frame-
works has become more difficult. Consequently, the employer
practice of targeting minority immigrants for less desirable jobs
goes undetected as a discriminatory practice in current anti-
discrimination jurisprudence. 8
Moreover, under the modern frameworks, the fact of segrega-
tion in a particularjob is virtually irrelevant to a hiring, promotion,
or wage discrimination claim, unless the segregation is a symptom
of adverse employment conditions. Because mere segregation does
not in itself require an explanation, even if a discrimination claim
is successful the remedy need not necessarily eliminate it. The as-
sumption may be that the remedy-for example, promotion into a
more desirable position-will eventually dismantle the segregated
workplace. Under that assumption based on anti-classification
principles, there is no need to address the structures that make the
job substandard. Presumably, this is unproblematic because the
equality and anti-discrimination principle does not necessarily en-
compass the right to be free from substandard working conditions.
Below, I briefly review the disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment paradigms and discuss a frequent employer defense under
the paradigms.
A. The Traditional Disparate Impact and Disparate
Treatment Paradigms
Under the disparate impact framework, the plaintiff must show
that some facially neutral employment policy or practice has a
promotion and channeling policy); Banks v. City of Albany, 953 F. Supp. 28 (N.D.N.Y. 1997)
(denying summary judgment motion and allowing plaintiff to proceed on claim that fire
department's use of subjective criteria in hiring had a disparate impact on minorities); Jen-
kins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 1399 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (allowing plaintiff to
proceed to trial on a disparate impact claim where plaintiff argued that employer's subjec-
tive evaluation procedure for promotion resulted in an underrepresentation of Blacks in
targeted positions).
27. Examples include the restructuring of industries so that jobs are more decentral-
ized, contingent, and segmented. See STONE, supra note 2, at 72-86.
28. This use of race and national origin is analogous to the first generation discrimina-
tion that legal scholar Susan Sturm describes in her article. Sturm, supra note 23, at 465-68.
The fact that employers discriminate so openly in tracking people into jobs rather than
keeping them out of opportunities makes the inexorable 100 concept both salient and nec-
essary in today's workplace.
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significantly disproportionate impact on a protected class.2 9 If the
plaintiff makes this showing, the employer must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that its policy or practice is related
to the job in question and consistent with business necessity. 0 If the
employer meets the burden, the plaintiff can still prove that the
defendant refused to adopt a less discriminatory alternative prac-
tice; and the employer may still be found liable for
discrimination.
The disparate treatment model, in contrast, requires proof of in-
tentional, differential treatment. Under the traditional framework
developed by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, the plaintiff can prove employer intent by bringing forward
direct evidence of that intent or by introducing circumstantial evi-
dence that the plaintiff sought an opportunity, was denied that
opportunity on account of her or his membership in a protected
category, and the employer continued to offer the opportunity to
others. 2 If the plaintiff meets the McDonnell Douglas burden, the
employer must provide evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for the employment action to avoid liability.3 3 Where the
employer supplies a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, the
plaintiff may still show that the employer's business reason is a pre-
text for discrimination.34 Under this model, the focus of the inquiry
remains on the employer's intent, which is difficult to prove, espe-
cially through circumstantial evidence.
A plaintiff also may challenge disparate treatment in job terms
and conditions. In these cases, the plaintiff challenges an em-
ployer's intentional practices or actions that result in a protected
group getting worse treatment than other employees. In the classic
example, an employer maintains a weight cap for stewardesses be-
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1)(A)(i) (2000); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-
331 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
30. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). Title VII states:
(k) Burden of proof in disparate impact cases.
(1) (A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under
this title only if-
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment
practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for
the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party [demonstrates] ... an alternative employment practice and
the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (k)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2000).
32. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
33. Id. at 802-03.
34. Id. at 804; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143-48 (2000).
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cause all of the employees in the category are women." The
women claim differential treatment based on their gender. The
differential treatment is often substantially worse than the manner
in which the company treats those in similarly situated positions.
The segregated status of the stewardess position, per se, is a secon-
dary consideration.
B. The Employer Interest Defense in the Traditional Frameworks
Employers frequently defend themselves against both disparate
treatment and disparate impact claims by arguing that they should
not be held responsible for employees' interest or lack of interest
in a particular job. This argument asserts that employees have pre-
conceived and circumscribed notions of what types ofjobs they are
willing to accept, and it is those notions rather than employers'
actions that are responsible for segregated workplaces.
Neither of the current frameworks effectively scrutinizes the in-
terrelationship between the employer's ability to structure jobs and
the choices that employees make aboutjobs. Commentators on the
lack of interest defense and the rhetoric of choice have introduced
sociological and empirical studies to show that an employee's
choice is much more structured and circumscribed by employer
practices than is typically believed. 6 Presumably, the overrepresen-
tation of a particular group in a particular job may reflect the
employees' choices as much as anything else. If we consider, how-
ever, that employers have the power to circumscribe workers'
choices, then the employer's response to a differential impact or
disparate treatment allegation-that the market dictates labor
composition-carries less weight.
In the brown collar context, the employer may argue in defense
to a disparate impact or treatment claim that no one else is inter-
ested in the brown collar job, and that the employer is not
responsible for the interest of employees in certain jobs,
35. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 E3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000). Part II.C infra
provides an analysis of this and other conditions cases in segregated workplaces and their
effectiveness in eradicating discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.
36. See ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P. BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER INEQUALITY:
COURTS, MARKETS, AND UNEQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN IN AMERICA 53-100 (1999); William T.
Bielby, Social Science Accounts of the Maternal Wall: Applications in Litigation Contexts, 26 T. JEF-
FERSON L. REV. 15 passim (2003); Tracy E. Higgins, Job Segregation, Gender Blindness, and
Employee Agency, 55 ME. L. REv. 241, 251-59 (2003); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women
and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the
Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. Rav. 1749, 1815-39 (1990).
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particularly when that interest is influenced by societal factors.37
Again, this argument ignores the possibility that workplace struc-
tures are established through an employer's hiring and assignment
policies, and that the ensuing segregation is at least an indication
of discriminatory practices.38 For example, an employer may act on
a preconception that Latinos are more desirable for service jobs
than other workers because of their work ethic .9 The employer
hires and assigns Latinos to entry level service jobs, and other re-
quirements, such as language proficiency, hinder their promotion
opportunities. As a result, Latinos are very quickly overrepresented
in entry level service jobs and underrepresented elsewhere.
One of the original purposes of anti-discrimination law was to
eliminate segregated workplaces and the inferior terms and condi-
tions of employment that persist in them.40 The existing disparate
impact and disparate treatment frameworks, however, do not rec-
ognize segregation as per se discrimination. As a result, they do not
easily or directly capture or remedy the harm of working in segre-
gated environments. 41 In each, the ultimate focus of the inquiry is
whether the employer's practices denied an opportunity or created
a barrier for a member of a protected class. 42 Plaintiffs in segre-
gated workplaces already have been hired and must overcome the
assumption that they have not been denied opportunity and thus
have suffered no harm since they were selected for a position. As a
37. See EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 301-304 (7th Cir. 1991)
(crediting defendant's argument that employees chose jobs according to their interests in a
disparate impact case); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 320-22, 354-55 (7th
Cir. 1988) (crediting defendant's argument that employees chose jobs according to their
interests in a disparate impact claim and disparate treatment claim, respectively).
38. STONE, supra note 2, at 165-66; Green, supra note 2, at 104, 108-09.
39. ROGER WALDINGER & MICHAEL I. LICHTER, How THE OTHER HALF WORKS: IMMI-
GRATION AND THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LABOR 160-63 (2003).
40. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 22 RUTGERS L. REv. 465, 471-74 (1968) (explaining that Title VII was initially directed
at recruitment and hiring practices that excluded or segregated minorities); see alsoJohnson
v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 632 (1987) (stating that Title VII was designed to dismantle
segregated workplaces, including those based on sex); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1979) (reviewing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and conclud-
ing that "[t]he crux of the problem [was] to open employment opportunities for Negroes in
occupations which have been traditionally closed to them.. ."); Vicki Schultz & Stephen
Petterson, Race, Gender Work and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title
VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 1073, 1075 (1992) (analyzing the
success rate of employer arguments that certain groups are underrepresented in some oc-
cupations because they choose not to work in those occupations).
41. Richard Epstein's description of Blacks offered jobs under segregated conditions
reflects this view. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 91-97 (1992).
42. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codi-
fied as amended in pertinent part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 (2004)); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
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consequence, plaintiffs are forced to attack segregated conditions
indirectly.
II. RESPONSES TO SEGREGATED CONDITIONS WORKING UNDER THE
DISPARATE TREATMENT AND DISPARATE IMPACT PARADIGMS
In this section, I analyze how plaintiffs have attacked segregated
workplaces under the existing frameworks and the extent of their
success. The first case examined, Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, pre-
sents a classic challenge to segregation because its resolution has
created enduring obstacles to challenging segregation.43 The re-
maining cases examined are examples of pay equity and
comparable worth cases, conditions cases, and national origin
cases. In earlier generations, these have served the purpose of at-
tacking the conditions of segregated workplaces.
In most cases, the plaintiffs have had to identify some harm,
other than the segregation itself, to succeed in their discrimination
claims. To accomplish this plaintiffs have pointed out channeling
practices in some cases; in other cases, non-hired plaintiffs make
the claims, indirectly pointing out the fact of segregation. In still
other cases and with mixed success, plaintiffs have made the segre-
gation and its conditions the focus of the claim.
A. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio: The Anti-Inexorable Zero Case
Wards Cove is an example of the classic plaintiff challenge to seg-
regated workplaces. Its outcome presents challenges for plaintiffs
working in segregated jobs and occupations today, even though
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to ameliorate its most
harmful effects. In Wards Cove, minority employees in cannery jobs
challenged the job structure and composition of the cannery and
noncannery jobs in a packing plant. Filipino, Hispanic, Asian, and
Eskimo employees held the unstable, lower-paying, and less desir-
able cannery jobs." Anglos held the stable and more desirable
noncannery jobs.45 In challenging the employer's practice of hiring
minorities for the cannery jobs and nonminorities for the noncan-
nery jobs, the plaintiffs utilized both disparate impact and
43. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
44. Id. at 647.
45. Id.
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disparate treatment theories. They demonstrated, through statis-
tical evidence of racial composition of the workers in each job
category, that the underrepresentation of workers in a targeted job
was not likely the result of chance.47
The employer responded with the interest defense, alleging that
minority workers simply were not interested in or skilled enough
for the more desirable jobs.48 It also argued that the statistical evi-
dence was both overinclusive and underinclusive.4  It was
overinclusive because it included people who may not have been
interested in the jobs.0 It was underinclusive because the numbers
did not include the composition of the local labor pool,51 even
though the plaintiffs demonstrated that the company used its in-
ternal labor market as the pool for transferring from one job to
another.2 The Supreme Court accepted the employer's argument
and held that because the plaintiffs failed to produce adequate sta-
tistical evidence that measured the status of similarly situated
employees, the plaintiffs did not meet their causation burden.5
1. The Problems of Wards Cove
The Court's narrow framing of the issue in Wards Cove--whether
plaintiffs were worse off than similarly situated employees, rather
than whether the employer was targeting minority workers for the
bottom-rung jobs-prevents current plaintiffs from attacking seg-
regation of nonminority and minority employees into high-wage,
highly desirable, and low-wage, undesirable, positions respec-
tively-the type of segregation prevalent today. The Court ignored
the segregation and the subordinated conditions in the lower-
paying jobs. Although this narrow review may have been doctri-
nally sound in a strict sense, for a hiring case, it did not adequately
address the general claim that minorities were relegated to the
least desirable jobs. As Justice Stevens' dissent noted:
The Court points out that nonwhites are "overrepresented"
among the cannery workers. Such an imbalance will be true
46. Id. at 648. The employer appealed the Ninth Circuit's disparate impact holding to
the Supreme Court. Id. at 649-50.
47. Id. at 650.
48. Id. at 652.




53. Id. at 654-55.
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in any racially stratified work force; its significance becomes
apparent only upon examination of the pattern of segregation
within the work force. In the cannery industry nonwhites are
concentrated in positions offering low wages and little oppor-
tunity for promotion. Absent any showing that the
"underrepresentation" of whites in this stratum is the result of
a barrier to access, the "overrepresentation" of nonwhites
does not offend Tide VII.
5 4
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Wards Cove set out the dilemma for
future plaintiffs:
This industry long has been characterized by a taste for dis-
crimination of the old-fashioned sort: a preference for hiring
nonwhites to fill its lowest level positions, on the condition
that they stay there. The majority's legal rulings essentially
immunize these practices from attack under a Tide VII dispa-
rate-impact analysis. Sadly this comes as no surprise,5
The formalistic application of the anti-discrimination frameworks
prevented the Court from inquiring into the overrepresentation of
minority workers, and the mechanisms that placed and kept them,
in low-wage jobs.
2. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 superseded many of the Wards Cove
holdings.56 Under the Act, the plaintiff must still show a causal
connection between the adverse employment conditions and spe-
cific employer conduct. 57 However, the plaintiff now can point to a
constellation of factors to show causation s.5 Notably, in response to
a prima facie disparate impact claim, the defendant must establish
that a challenged employment practice is 'job related for the posi-
tion in question and consistent with business necessity. 5 9 The
54. Id. at 678 n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' concerns underscore the
need for an inexorable 100 inference. The inference would focus a Court's inquiry on the
overrepresentation of minority workers and the mechanisms that place and keep them in
low-wage jobs, allowing the Court to develop remedies to fix those conditions.
55. Id. at 662 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
56. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. Congress left ambiguity, however, when it embraced both the 'job related" and
"business necessity" interpretations of the defendant's burden. See id. § 3. Congress' refer-
ence to cases before Ward's Cove for direction on the defendant's burden provides little
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defendant has both the burdens of proof and persuasion on this
element of the defense.'
Significantly for the purposes of this Article, however, the 1991
Act failed to provide clear guidance on whether a segregated
workplace by itself created an inference of discrimination when
minorities and non-minorities were sorted into jobs with different
skill requirements. Consequently, litigators bringing cases in the
wake of the Act took their cues from Wards Cove and refrained
from attacking segregated workplaces head on. Thus, most of the
cases since 1991 have been argued within the existing frameworks,
either through channeling, subjective criteria theories, or by chal-
lenging word-of-mouth or other mechanisms. 6' The remaining
subsections explore how plaintiffs have attacked segregation indi-
rectly.
B. The Wage Inequity Cases
Wage inequity cases challenge the devaluation of jobs held pre-
dominantly by women and minorities, a phenomenon long
considered a symptom of segregated workplaces.62 The theory,
framed early on as comparable worth, asserted that women and
men should be paid equally for jobs that produced equivalent
value. A wage inequity claim involved comparing male and female
pay rates through job evaluation studies,3 which would demon-
strate the internal worth of a particular job, regardless of who held
it.6 4 A job that was underpaid in comparison to a job evaluation
guidance because those courts were just as ambiguous about what the defendant had to
demonstrate to overcome a showing of disparate impact. See Michael Sarno, Employers Who
Implement Pre-Employment Tests to Screen Their Applicants Beware (or Not), 48 VILL. L. REv. 1403,
1415, n.41 (2003) (explaining the political compromises made across the aisle to reach
consensus on the language for the business necessity defense); see also BarbaraJ. Flagg, Fash-
ioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE LJ. 2009,
2022-23 (1995); David E. Hollar, Physical Ability Tests and Title VII, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 777,
785-93 (2000) (describing different standards used by circuit courts in applying the business
necessity defense).
60. 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw HANDBOOK 119 (Barbara Lindemann & Paul
Grossman eds., 4th ed. 2007).
61. See, e.g., EEOC v. Consol. Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1993) (addressing word
of mouth); EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1991) (same);
Butler v. Home Depot Inc., 984 F Supp. 1257 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (addressing channeling);
Stender v. Lucky Stores Inc., 803 E Supp. 259 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (same).
62. Ruth G. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 397, 428-34 (1979).
63. NELSON & BRIDGES, supra note 36, at 25.
64. NELSON & BRIDGES, supra note 36, at 50.
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study was presumed to be shaped by market forces that adversely
affected a particular protected group, usually females.
65
The implicit assumption behind comparable worth theory was
that dismantling unequal wage structures would naturally result in
more desirable jobs for the people who held the jobs.6 For exam-
ple, in EEOC v. General Telephone Co. of Northwest, Inc., female
plaintiffs claimed that they were relegated to lower-paying jobs be-
cause they were women, showing through regression analyses that
they were denied access to the higher-payingjobs. The remedy for
such a claim would involve giving women access to the more desir-
able jobs. The inquiry in such a case could easily have focused on
whether women were interested in the targeted job, but signifi-
candy, the court held that the EEOC did not have to account for
differential interest in the jobs as part of its proof burden.6 Thus,
the employer could not benefit from an inference of nondiscrimi-
nation simply because the EEOC failed to account for lack of
interest in its analysis.
The more typical wage inequity claim, however, forced plaintiffs
to account for all possible nondiscriminatory factors that might
result in pay inequities. Often nondiscriminatory factors were con-
sidered outside of the employer's control. In Spaulding v. University
of Washington, for example, the court held that market forces were
not considered a specific employment practice, a necessary ele-
ment of an adverse impact claim. ° Likewise, in EEOC v. Hartford
Insurance Co., the court held that the plaintiffs had to demonstrate
that other factors, such as education, seniority, or experience, did
not explain the wage differential.71 Other courts have reached simi-
72lar conclusions. As a result, the comparable worth theory was
short-lived. The disparate impact and disparate treatment frame-
works made too many allowances for the power of the market to
65. Blumrosen, supra note 62, at 428. See also County of Washington v. Gunther, 452
U.S. 161, 166 n.6 (1981) (citing Blumrosen's article).
66. Blumrosen, supra note 62, at 466-68.
67. EEOC v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Northwest, 885 F.2d 575, 577 (9th Cir. 1989).
68. Id. at 581.
69. Id.
70. Spaulding v. Univ. of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 708 (9th Cir. 1984).
71. EEOC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. H-77-554, 1983 WL 30378 (D. Conn. Feb. 18,
1983).
72. See, e.g., AFSCME v. County of Nassau, 799 E Supp. 1370 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Int'l
UAW v. State, 673 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Mich. 1987), aff'd, 886 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1989); EEOC
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. I11. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.
1988); AFSCME v. State, 578 F Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983), rev'd, 770 E2d 1401 (9th Cir.
1985); Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982); NELSON & BRIDGES,
supra note 36, at 12-13, 40-45.
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explain wage difference. To the extent that courts were reluctant
to attribute causation to employers in the wage setting, plaintiffs
failed to succeed in their claims.
7 4
One of the major problems with the comparable worth theory,
therefore, was its simultaneous reliance on and rejection of the
market. In other words, "[i] t accepted the orthodox economic view
that pay differentials originated in the 'market,' but it also entailed
the intractable position of rejecting markets as a valid basis for
wage setting."75 The first of the following two cases demonstrates
the limited use of pay equity theory in eliminating segregation,
while the latter case illustrates the upper bound of the theory.
1. County of Washington v. Gunther
The Limited Use of Pay Equity Theory to Dismantle Segregation
A limited line of cases successfully attacked pay inequalities un-
der the disparate treatment framework by demonstrating that the
employer intentionally devalued jobs held by women.76 The focus
of these cases was on differential treatment and not subordinating
structures. The Supreme Court examined this theory in County of
73. See e.g., AFSCME v. State, 770 E2d at 1408 (reversing district court's finding that de-
fendant violated Title VII) ("The State of Washington's initial reliance on a free market
system in which employees in male-dominated jobs are compensated at a higher rate than
employees in dissimilar female-dominated jobs is not in and of itself a violation of Title VII,
notwithstanding that the Willis study deemed the positions of comparable worth. Absent a
showing of discriminatory motive, which has not been made here, the law does not permit
the federal courts to interfere in the market-based system for the compensation of Washing-
ton's employees."); AFSCME v. County of Nassau, 799 F. Supp. at 1414 ("The defendants are
correct to argue that their reliance on the market in their compensation system does not
give rise to Title VII liability.... The market has animated every aspect of the County com-
pensation system since 1967. Thus ... the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate current Title
VII sex discrimination by the County."); Int'l UAW v. State, 673 F. Supp. at 900 ("[W]age dis-
parities between predominantly male and female groups do exist in the labor market."),
affd, 886 F.2d at 769-70 ("Title VII is not a substitute for the free market, which historically
determines labor rates.... Mere failure to rectify traditional wage disparities that exist in
the marketplace between predominantly male and predominantly female jobs is not action-
able.... Without discriminatory motive, defendant's reliance on the market to guide its
classification and compensation system is not actionable under Title VII."); Briggs, 536 F.
Supp. at 445, 447 ("The statute's remedial purpose is not so broad as to make employers
liable for employment practices of others or for existing market conditions.... Where ...
different skills are required for the performance of the jobs, the employer may explain and
justify an apparent illegal wage disparity by showing that persons possessing the requisite
skills are commanding higher wage rates in the local market."); NELSON & BRIDGES, supra
note 36, at 40-45.
74. NELSON & BRIDGES, supra note 36, at 49.
75. NELSON & BRIDGES, supra note 36, at 3.
76. See e.g., AFSCME v. County of Nassau, 799 F. Supp. 1370 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
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Washington v. Gunther.7 In Gunther, female jail wardens alleged that
the County of Washington, Oregon, intentionally paid female war-
dens, but not male wardens, less than what a county survey of equal
jobs commanded in the market.78 These were clearly segregated
jobs, and the employer had several rationales for their continued
segregation.79 The district court dismissed the wage discrimination
claim, and the circuit court reversed. s° The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.8 ' At the outset of the opinion, Justice Brennan noted
that this case was not a "comparable worth" case, "under which
plaintiffs might claim increased compensation on the basis of a
comparison of the intrinsic worth or difficulty of their job with that
of otherjobs in the same organization or community.8 s2 Instead, he
noted, "respondents seek to prove, by direct evidence, that their
wages were depressed because of intentional sex discrimination,
consisting of setting the wage scale for female guards, but not for
male guards, at a level lower than its own survey of outside markets
and the worth of the jobs warranted."3
The Court concluded that where an employer accepted the re-
sults of ajob survey for male employees, paying them the full value
under the survey, while at the same time rejecting job evaluation
studies for female employees, paying them seventy percent of the
value of their worth according to ajob survey, could lead to an in-
ference of intentional discrimination. 4 This differential treatment,
the Court noted, did not require the Court to evaluate statistical or
other subjective methods of wage discrimination proof15 The
Court ruled that Title VII covered compensation discrimination in
cases like the plaintiffs' where the jobs being compared were not
equal to each other.
8 6
The Gunther court attempted to address one of the conse-
quences of segregated workplaces through the intentional
discrimination framework, but it did not directly address the actual
segregating dynamic of the workplace. The Court's remedy in-
volved changing the pay structure to reflect a more equitable wage
77. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
78. Id. at 164-65.
79. Id. at 164. The plaintiffs conceded that gender was a bona fide occupational quali-
fication for some of these positions. Id. at 164 n.2.
80. Id. at 165-66.
81. Id. at 166.
82. Id. (citation omitted).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 180-81.
85. Id. at 181.
86. Id.
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system. The pay equity theory works, however, only if litigants can
point to some employment practice that is intentionally applied
differentially or has differential effects. Even then, it can be as vul-
nerable to market-based defenses as is the traditional comparable
worth theory.
2. AFSCME v. County of Nassau:
The Limits on Pay Equity Theory for Eradicating Segregation
Cases such as AFSCME v. County of Nassau 8 demonstrate the vul-
nerability of the pay equity strategy to employers' market-based
arguments, even in the wake of Civil Rights Act of 1991. In
AFSCME, the plaintiffs sued Nassau County, alleging that the
county discriminated "in compensation on the basis of sex by pay-
ing historically female job classifications less than historically male
classifications which require an equivalent or lesser composite of
skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions. 89 The term
"female dominated" was defined in the lawsuit as job classifications
in which females comprised seventy percent or more of the classifi-
cation 90
The plaintiffs specifically challenged the initial job evaluation
process, which established the pay scales for each job within the
county structure.9" The court, however, did not find intentional
discrimination in the initial establishment of the process. 2 The
court refused to credit the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert, who
explained that the job evaluation process produced lower salary
grades for female-dominated job classifications that had the same
evaluated worth as those of male-dominated jobs.93 Instead, the
court credited the county's explanation that the 'market' deter-
mined the wage rates, 4 finding it sufficient to explain differential
treatment of segregated job categories. 95 This precluded any find-
ing of intentional discrimination.
The court also found that the evidence of segregation produced
by the plaintiffs was insufficient to support their intentional wage
87. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 165-66 (1981).
88. AFSCME v. County of Nassau, 799 F. Supp. 1370, 1370 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
89. Id. at 1372 (quoting Am. Compl. 1 3(D)).
90. Id. at 1373.
91. Id. at 1378.
92. Id. at 1379.
93. Id. at 1380.




discrimination claims.96 While the sex segregation in county jobs
was higher than the national average, no evidence existed of de-
fendant's intent to create such segregation.97 Segregation was
instead presumed to be a natural occurrence, and additional evi-
dence was required to support a finding of discrimination. Even
acknowledging that the county historically had created barriers to
participation for women in some jobs, the court accepted the em-
ployer's lack of interest defense for the contemporary existence of
sex segregated jobs: "the better explanation for the existing sex
segregation in Nassau County job tiles is that which was agreed
upon by all the experts who testified in this case: that men and
women do not, on the whole, seek the same positions." The court
attributed the segregation to employee choice, rather than any
choices made by employers, and the comparable worth theory
could not counter that argument. The court noted that "the mere
fact that most Nassau County employees work in job tiles that are
either female-dominated or male-dominated does not in itself sup-
port an inference of discriminatory intent."100
In addition to demonstrating the vulnerability of disparate im-
pact and treatment frameworks to market-based defenses, the
AFSCME court's analysis indicates that it may be irrelevant that the
job conditions of a particular position that happens to be female-
dominated are less than adequate, as long as there are adequate
means of advancing from the position. Moreover, the court's rea-
soning reiterates that under the current frameworks, segregation
alone is not enough to support a discrimination finding.
C. The Conditions Cases: The Anti-Subordination Paradigm Response
In the conditions cases, plaintiffs challenged other aspects of
exploitation in segregated environments. In a disparate treatment
framework, courts analyze exploitative conditions as possible
evidence of differential treatment. In the disparate impact model,
parties attempt to identify a facially neutral policy or practice that
has substantial adverse effects on the conditions experienced by a
protected group. This line of cases initially arose out of the compa-
rable worth theory's premise that women's work is devalued, and
that the jobs are treated as "women's jobs," rather than that the
96. Id. at 1404.
97. Id. at 1405.
98. Id. at 1404-05.
99. Id. at 1404.
100. Id. at 1405.
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people in the jobs are being treated discriminatorily. The proto-
type cases under this theory are Gerdom v. Continental Airlines0' and
Frank v. United Airlines, Inc.0 2 In conditions cases, plaintiffs allege
that an employer has implemented a practice or policy that affects
the terms and conditions of employment in a particular job cate-
gory because it is comprised of a particular social group, for
example. In Gerdom, a group of airline stewardesses sued Continen-
tal Airlines for maintaining a strict weight requirement for its
stewardesses.103 Stewardesses who did not stay within the weight
limit were suspended or fired. 0 4 No similar restriction was placed
on any all-male classes of employees, including the male attendant
category.0 5 The plaintiffs alleged that Continental imposed the re-
quirement-a condition of work-precisely because the stewardess
job category was a traditionally female category.'06 In other words,
the requirement existed because the job was considered a
"woman's job." The court held that the policy was discriminatory
because it relied on the composition of the workforce."7 Had men
been in the position, the court reasoned, the weight requirement
would not have been implemented, as evidenced by the fact that
the weight requirement did not exist in any of the other posi-
tions.' s
Gerdom alluded to the theory accepted in Gunther that the differ-
ential application of a policy (there, the implementation of a job
worth study) can be proof of discrimination.' °9 The Gunther line of
cases illustrates the breadth of the doctrine when an anti-
subordination principle undergirds its operation. Because the Gun-
ther court focused on the jobs involved, rather than on the people
holding the jobs, it targeted the cognitive biases that surround em-
ployer decisions aboutjobs perceived as belonging to one group or
another. The Gerdom opinion followed a similar line of reasoning.
Frank v. United Airlines, Inc. is representative of cases where a
formerly segregated job classification becomes integrated, yet the
job conditions for female workers remain worse than the job con-
101. Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 692 E2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982).
102. Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000).
103. Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 603.
104. Id. at 604.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 605.
107. Id. at 607-08.
108. Id. at 610.
109. Like Gunther, it was not a comparable worth claim in the sense that it did not seek
a remedy based on a comparison between the worth of the job and that of other jobs in the




ditions for male workers." ° In Frank, a group of female flight atten-
dants sued United Airlines for its discriminatory weight
requirement policies."' The plaintiffs showed that even though
United imposed maximum weight requirements on both female
and male flight attendants, the weight requirements were more
onerous for women than for men.11 2 The plaintiffs claimed dispa-
rate treatment in the way that United formulated its weight
restrictions.' 3 United had maximum weight limits for men that
corresponded to large frame males on a MetLife height/weight
chart."4 For women, however, United had weight maximums that
corresponded to medium frame females on a Continental
height/weight chart."5 The Ninth Circuit held that United's differ-
ential treatment of weight restrictions was facially discriminatory
because it was more onerous for women than for men.116
Frank demonstrated that without dismantling the underlying
causes of discrimination, the conditions created before integration
would persist. Further, it showed that where a previously segre-
gated occupation becomes integrated, but the underlying
conditions remain unchanged, women are forced to rely on an un-
equal treatment argument, rather than on the structural argument
that their jobs are being treated as "women's jobs," to achieve re-
dress. With such claims, a court may still limit remedies to redress
the specific areas of unequal treatment rather than dismantle the
forces at work behind the traditionally segregated occupation.
D. The National Origin Cases
Although not strictly segregation cases, national origin-based
claims have been aimed at brown collar workplaces." 7 These cases
attack employer practices that target or affect immigrants, regard-
less of status, because of their national origin. Given the focus on
national origin, these cases address exploitation of workers who
may or may not have proper immigration status.
110. 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000).
111. Id. at 848.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 848-49.
114. Id. at 848.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 855.
117. See, e.g., Colindres v. Quiefflex, 427 F. Supp. 2d 737 (S.D. Tex. 2006); EEOC v.John
Pickle Company, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Okla. 2006); EEOC v. Bice of Chicago, 229
F.R.D. 581, 583 (N.D. Il. 2005).
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Under traditional doctrine, cases alleging discrimination based
on immigration status do not fall within the rubric of national ori-
gin discrimination." ' In a foundational case, Espinoza v. Farah Mfg.
Co.," 9 the Supreme Court reviewed an employer policy that prohib-
ited the hiring of noncitizens for manufacturing jobs."" Pursuant
to this policy, the plaintiff claimed that she had been discriminated
against on the basis of national origin.1 ' The Court held that
alienage, or immigration status, was not a necessary characteristic
of national origin 2 2 and that national origin means the country of
descent or ancestry 23 An employer could make distinctions be-
tween immigration status without running afoul of the prohibition
on national origin discrimination.124 The Court acknowledged,
however, that if an employer used alienage distinctions as a proxy
for national origin discrimination, it could face liability.125 As it
noted, "a citizenship requirement might be but one part of a wider
scheme of unlawful national-origin discrimination," or "an em-
ployer might use a citizenship test as a pretext to disguise what is in
fact national-origin discrimination.'2 6
The warning in Espinoza that employer practices distinguishing
between employee immigration statuses might signal national ori-
gin discrimination has since resulted in successful challenges to
employer treatment of immigrants. In a recent case, the EEOC ap-
plied the theory to employment practices that intentionally target
immigrant workers for less desirable, lower-paying positions-
essentially, the segregated, "inexorable 100" jobs. In EEOC v. Tech-
nocrest Sys., Inc., the EEOC investigated a technology firm after a
group of Filipino workers filed claims of national origin discrimi-
nation.2 7 Technocrest was an electronics and computer repair
company in Missouri that employed approximately 100 technical
employees, all of whom were in the United States from the Philip-
pines on non-immigrant H-lB visas. 28 The plaintiffs claimed that
Technocrest specifically recruited them in the Philippines, and
118. SeeEspinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95-96 (1973).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 87.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 88-89.
123. Id. at 89.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 92.
126. Id.
127. EEOC v. Technocrest Sys., Inc., 448 F.3d 1035, 1037 (8th Cir. 2006).
128. Id. at 1037.
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then subjected them to working conditions and wages worse than
promised and worse than those of other workers. 129
During its investigation, the EEOC issued an administrative sub-
poena to Technocrest seeking the work history and immigration
status for all workers who filled the same positions as the Filipino
workers, namely, electronics engineers, field service representa-
tives, and systems analysts.2 ° The district court narrowed the
subpoena's scope to information about the six charging parties.13
It required the company to submit work history information in
spreadsheet form for all other employees in the same three catego-
ries of jobs.3 2 Both sides appealed the decision to the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals.' 3
Technocrest argued that it should not be required to submit in-
formation about all employees in the plaintiffs' job categories
because it included irrelevant information about employees who
were not similarly situated. 3 4 Technocrest also objected to the de-
mand for information regarding immigration and citizenship
status on the grounds that such information was not relevant to
national origin discrimination.3 3 Technocrest acknowledged that
its technical employee job category, in essence, was segregated, but
asserted that the EEOC could not make out a prima facie case of
discrimination where "all the technical employees of Technocrest
are Filipino." 36 In other words, Technocrest argued that proof of
the inexorable 100 could not, without more, provide the inference
of discrimination that plaintiffs sought. The logical extension of
this argument is that if all the employees are Filipino, they cannot
allege differential treatment within the same job category.
The Eighth Circuit, however, left the door open to an inexora-
bility inference. It observed that the Supreme Court:
recognized in Espinoza that in some instances "a citizenship
requirement might be but one part of a wider scheme of
unlawful national-origin discrimination" and that Title VII
"prohibits discrimination on the basis of citizenship whenever
129. See id.
130. Id. at 1037-38.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1038.
134. See id. at 1039.
135. Id.
136. See id. Technocrest attempted to use Espinoza to its advantage, arguing that because
national origin did not extend to citizenship requirements, the Filipino charging parties
could not make claims based on their immigration status. See id.; Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co.,
414 U.S. 86,89,92 (1973).
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it has the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of
national origin."
37
The Eighth Circuit broadened the scope of the district court's or-
der, allowing the EEOC to collect information about working
conditions as well as immigration status of all Technocrest employ-
ees in the relevant job categories in order to develop the case for
national origin discrimination.9
National origin cases could become crucial in the brown collar
worker context because the public is increasingly accepting of im-
migrants being channeled into second-class jobs with fewer rights.
Temporary worker proposals, for example, potentially condone
segregation and create a legal mechanism through which employ-
ers can exploit groups based on their alienage. 39 Such treatment
masks what many commentators consider discrimination based on
national origin or similar subordinated group status.
40
Several scholars have addressed the alienage/national origin dis-
tinction, and have found that alienage classifications tend to
legitimize unlawful ethnic discrimination. T What makes alienage
distinctions so dangerous, and yet so attractive, is that they are a
socially acceptable way of distinguishing the majority from the
"other." They appeal to both nativist and protectionist tendencies
without necessarily invoking allegations of racism. Thus, while jobs
populated by temporary workers and other aliens lose wage status,
exhibit higher wage differentials, and deteriorate in terms and
conditions over time,'142 the existing anti-discrimination frameworks
do not readily accept such treatment as discriminatory. The Su-
137. Id. (quoting Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 92).
138. See id. at 1040.
139. See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503,
507-09 (2007) (arguing that a temporary guest worker program places immigrant workers
outside the "labor citizenship" paradigm and undermines the quality of work in the jobs
occupied by these workers).
140. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration, Civil Rights and Coalitions for Social Justice, 1
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 181 (2003). See generally Ian Haney Lopez, Race and Color-
blindness After Hernandez and Brown, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 61, 66 (2005).
141. See, e.g., Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Girls Lost Their Accents, 85
CAL. L. REV. 1347, 1348-57 (1997) (analyzing, among other things, the limited ability of
Title VII to protect Latinos in language cases); Ruben J. Garcia, Across the Borders: Immigrant
Status and Identity in Law and LatCrit Theory, 55 FLA. L. REV. 511, 515-19 (2003) (discussing
the ambiguous status of immigrants and their rights in workplace law); Juan E Perea, Ethnic-
ity and Prjudice: Reevaluating "National Origin" Discrimination under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 805, 823-27 (discussing the difficulties of constructing the definition of national
origin); Gloria Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confundidos: De-Conflating Latinos/as' Race and Ethnicity,
19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 69, 90-95 (1998) (arguing that by conflating distinct Latino
identities the dominant legal culture has marginalized Latinos).
142. Saucedo, supra note 11, at 964-65.
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preme Court case law supports the dominant view that alienage
distinctions are both benign and to be tolerated, in and out of the
workplace. 43 Moreover, it distinguishes between alienage and na-
tional origin and tends to condone different treatment based on
alienage where it cannot be shown that immigration status differ-
ences serve as a proxy for national origin discrimination.
144
The cases discussed here provide examples of plaintiffs challeng-
ing segregating practices through the existing frameworks. Each
type of strategy has met with varying degrees of success. Impor-
tantly, however, because there is no segregation model that directly
ferrets out segregation, each only partially resolves this multifac-
eted problem. The pay inequity/comparable worth cases deal with
one symptom of segregation, the conditions cases attempt to eradi-
cate other terms and conditions that occur in segregated
workforces, and the national origin cases attempt to target em-
ployer assignment practices. In these cases, moreover, because the
courts operate within the existing frameworks, their opinions ig-
nore or devalue the vulnerabilities and specific social conditions
that allow employers to exploit brown collar workers. 145 A segrega-
tion model with a theoretical underpinning of
exploitation/subordination as discrimination would more effec-
tively attack segregation. Recognizing the inexorable 100
inference, based on the inexorable zero concept, is the proper first
step in establishing such a model.
143. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (holding that a California statute prohib-
iting an employer from knowingly hiring undocumented workers was not preempted by
federal law); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (holding that federal discrimination
against permanent residents in a medical insurance context was valid under a rational basis
review); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973) (accepting employer rules that dis-
tinguished on the basis of alienage). But see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that,
with respect to primary education, states could not discriminate against children based on
immigration status); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding that state welfare
laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and residency requirements violated the Equal
Protection clause).
144. See Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 92.
145. Scholars such as Richard Delgado, Jean Stefancic and Juan Perea discuss the dan-
gers of frameworks that fail to consider the effects of subordinating conditions outside of a
black-white paradigm. See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
AN INTRODUCTION 70-71 (2001);Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The
"Normal Science" of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1213, 1214-16 (1997).
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III. THE ORIGIN OF THE INEXORABLE ZERO IN THE PATTERN AND
PRACTICE PARADIGMAND THE INITIAL IMPETUS FOR A
SEGREGATION FRAMEWORK
The class action equivalent of the disparate treatment and im-
pact frameworks is the "pattern and practice" discrimination case.
In individual disparate impact and treatment cases, plaintiffs must
provide comparator evidence in order to show that they suffer sub-
stantially worse terms and conditions of employment. In group
animus claims, plaintiffs must show that an employer had a policy,
or "pattern or practice," of discrimination, often through highly
sophisticated statistical models. These models are typically highly
contested, and they frequently become the focus of the litigation.
The concept of the inexorable zero, the foundational theoretical
concept for the recognition of an inexorable 100 inference pro-
posed in this Article, originates in this class, or pattern and
practice, approach.
A. The Pattern and Practice Paradigm and the Inexorable Zero
Pattern and practice theory allows plaintiffs to attack systematic
discrimination that affects a protected class of employees within a
company. Since 1977, courts have accepted a pattern and practice
model of proof in class action disparate treatment and disparate
impact cases that allows the plaintiff to show, through a combina-
tion of statistical and anecdotal evidence, that the employer's
standard operating practice is discriminatory. 146 For example, the
plaintiff may present statistics that show that members of a pro-
tected class are excluded from a targeted position. Typically, the
plaintiff must supplement the statistical evidence with anecdotal
evidence of animus.
The Supreme Court first recognized the pattern and practice
model of proof in the context of employment discrimination in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States.14 In that case,
pattern and practice evidence revealed locked-in practices of em-
ployers and unions that excluded minorities from desirable jobs
despite the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.148 In Teamsters,
the government, on behalf of a group of Blacks and Latinos em-
ployed as short haul drivers, challenged several employment
practices that resulted in these groups being denied access to the
146. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 324-25.
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more desirable long haul driving routes held by white drivers. 49
The employer and the Teamsters union maintained a lock on those
jobs through a combination of a seniority system and a word-of-
mouth hiring system.150 The Supreme Court held that the employer
had a discriminatory hiring system as a matter of practice, or as a
standard operating procedure. 5' It based its ruling on both statisti-
cal and anecdotal evidence.' 52
Possibly the most damning evidence was the fact that virtually no
minorities held the more desirable line driver positions. Justice
O'Connor noted this fact in response to the employer's challenge
to the plaintiffs' statistical evidence:
The company's narrower attacks upon the statistical evi-
dence-that there was no precise delineation of the areas
referred to in the general population statistics, that the Gov-
ernment did not demonstrate that minority populations were
located close to terminals or that transportation was available,
that the statistics failed to show what portion of the minority
population was suited by age, health, or other qualifications to
hold trucking jobs, etc.-are equally lacking in force. At best,
these attacks go only to the accuracy of the comparison be-
tween the composition of the company's work force at various
terminals and the general population of the surrounding
communities. They detract little from the Government's fur-
ther showing that Negroes and Spanish-surnamed Americans
who were hired were overwhelmingly excluded from line-
driver jobs. Such employees were willing to work, had access
to the terminal, were healthy and of working age, and often
were at least sufficiently qualified to hold city-driver jobs. Yet
they became line drivers with far less frequency than whites
(of 2,919 whites who held driving jobs in 1971, 1,802 (62%)
were line drivers and 1,117 (38%) were city drivers; of 180
Negroes and Spanish-surnamed Americans who held driving
jobs, 13 (7%) were line drivers and 167 (93%) were city driv-
ers).
In any event, fine tuning of the statistics could not have ob-
scured the glaring absence of minority line drivers. As the
Court of Appeals remarked, the company's inability to rebut
149. Id. at 328-29.
150. Id.
151. Id. at324.
152. Id. at 339-42.
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the inference of discrimination came not from a misuse of sta-
tistics but from "the inexorable zero."153
The opinion spawned the "inexorable zero" as a rule of infer-
ence that commands deeper scrutiny in discrimination cases."'
B. The Focus on and Meaning of the "Inexorable Zero"
as a Rule of Inference
In many of the cases alleging workplace discrimination, plaintiffs
must rely on statistics, in the absence of direct evidence, to show a
pattern and practice of discrimination. As in Teamsters, disputes
surrounding the validity of statistical methods, the definition of
available labor pools, and the meaning of the statistics dominate
typical pattern and practice cases. In one specific instance, how-
ever, the focus on statistical evidence in a case-and on its
strengths and flaws-historically has yielded to common sense.
This is the instance of the "inexorable zero," where the plaintiff
demonstrates a complete absence of members of a protected cate-
gory in a targeted job or occupation. At the very least, the zero
itself provides some evidence that the employer may have a policy
or practice that results in a denial of opportunity for a protected
group or has an adverse effect on job status for that group.5 6 The
"inexorable zero" thus became its own rule of inference, support-
ing a presumption of discrimination independent of any statistics
introduced in a case. 57 Plaintiffs have invoked the inexorable zero
inference to demonstrate the effects or outcomes of discriminatory
practices in a wide variety of employment contexts, as discussed
further below. 8 In addition, the inexorable zero concept has
153. Id. at 342 n.23 (citations omitted).
154. See Note, The "Inexorable Zero", 117 HARV. L. REv. 1215, 1215-16 (2004).
155. Id. at 1216.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1218.
158. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 656-57 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (employment); Ewing v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y, Inc., No. 00 CIV.
7020(CM), 2001 WL 767070, at *6 (S.D.N.Y June 25, 2001) (work assignments, training, and
discipline); Victory v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 34 F Supp. 2d 809, 823 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (sex
discrimination in promotion); Ortiz-Del Valle v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 42 F Supp. 2d 334,
338 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (hiring); Barner v. City of Harvey, No. 95 C 3316, 1998 WL 664951,
at *50-51 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 1998) (firing); Lumpkin v. Brown, 960 F. Supp. 1339, 1352-53
(N.D. IIl. 1997) (age discrimination in hiring); EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 969 F. Supp.
727, 736-37 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (hiring); United States v. City of Belleville, No. 93CV0799-PER,
1995 WL 1943014, at *4 (S.D. Il. Aug. 8,1995) (hiring); Brief of American Law Deans Asso-
ciation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
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grown beyond the bounds of employment discrimination and
found traction in higher education and other types of segregation
159cases.
In employment discrimination case law, the circuits split on how
far courts should carry the inexorable zero inference in evaluating
employer motive.160 Under the dominant view, the zero represents
an employer's intent to keep a protected group out of a particular
job category.1 61 In a subset of those circuits, the inexorable zero
carries an inference because the zero, in addition to its common
sense meaning, also represents a statistically significant disparity
from comparison numbers.' In the minority view, the zero only
represents an absence of a protected group from a particular job




(2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 399070 (higher education; "Law schools seek ... to avoid
approaching 'the inexorable zero.'").
159. See, e.g.,Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1487-90 (11th Cir. 1983) (discussing the use
of statistics to establish a plaintiffs burden in the inexorable zero context in an immigration
case); Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 905 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (noting that a complete
absence of Hispanic, Chinese or Filipino forepersons over a thirty year period merited closer
scrutiny, including scrutiny into possible unconscious biases preventing their selection, de-
spite the court denying writ of habeas corpus); Brief of American Law Deans Association, supra
note 158, at 3 (higher education; "Law schools seek ... to avoid approaching 'the inexora-
ble zero.'").
160. See Note, supra note 154, at 1225-27. Compare EEOC v. 0 & G Spring & Wire Forms
Specialty Co., 38 F.3d 872, 879 (7th Cir. 1994) (using inexorable zero helped plaintiffs prove
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence), with Craik v. Minn. State Univ. Bd., 731
F.2d 465, 494 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting that zero is not inexorable without a showing of statis-
tical significance).
161. See, e.g., Loyd v. Phillips Bros., 25 F.3d 518, 524 n.4 (7th Cir. 1994); EEOC v. Atlas
Paper Box Co., 868 F.2d 1487, 1501 n.21 (6th Cir. 1989); Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 711
F.2d 647, 662 (5th Cir. 1983); Ewing, 2001 WL 767070, at *6; Ortiz-Del Valle, 42 F. Supp. 2d at
337 n.1; Barner, 1998 WL 664951, at *50; EEOC v. Andrew Corp., No. 81 C 4359, 1989 WL
32884, at *13-14 (N.D. III. Apr. 3, 1989); Calloway v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 642 F Supp.
663, 695-98 (M.D. Ga. 1986).
162. In these cases, courts acknowledge an inference of discrimination from the inexo-
rable zero evidence even though there is disagreement about its strength or significance in
statistical terms. See, e.g., Hill v. Ross, 183 F.3d 586, 591-92 (7th Cir. 1999); 0 & G Spring &
Wire, 38 F.3d at 879.
163. See, e.g., Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 456-57 (4th Cir. 1994) (requiring a comparison
to the qualified labor pool); Frazier v. Ford Motor Co., 176 F. Supp. 2d 719, 724 (W.D. Ky.
2001) (requiring evidence of numbers of African Americans in the qualified labor pool);
Jordan v. Shaw Indus., Inc., No. 6:93CV542, 1996 WL 1061687, at *10 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 13,
1996) ("Without evidence of the relevant labor pool, Jordan's 'inexorable zero' evidence is
insufficient, standing alone, to show discriminatory motive on the part of Shaw Industries."),
aff'd, 131 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 1997); EEOC v. Turtle Creek Mansion Corp., Civ. No. 3:93-CV-
1649-H, 1995 WL 478833, at "9-11 (N.D. Tex. May 18, 1995) (finding that, because the total
number of hiring decisions was small, inexorable zero evidence did not in itself require a
finding of discrimination), afrd, 82 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 1996).
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C. Finding Support for the Inexorable 100 in the Inexorable Zero
Employment Cases
Currently, because of the focus in the disparate impact and
treatment frameworks on jobs from which minorities have been
excluded rather than on jobs to which minorities have been rele-
gated, courts have not recognized the converse of the inexorable
zero, an inexorable 100 inference of discrimination. Ideally, the
inexorable 100 would be a shorthand common sense signal of a
discriminatory employer preference in the evolving labor market.
At the very least, it would alert an employer-in much the same
way that the inexorable zero currently does-that it should review
its practices to avoid future liability. The contribution of an inexo-
rable 100 inference would be an opportunity to create remedies
that both improve conditions in substandard jobs and that reach
further to end the segregation contributing to those conditions.
Just as the inexorable zero addresses the effects of extreme imbal-
ance by remedying the structures that cause a complete absence of
a protected category in a targeted job, the mirror image inexorable
100 would remedy the structures that create an overrepresentation
of a protected group in a particularjob category.
Since Teamsters, over eighty cases'6 have discussed or made use of
the inexorable zero in a variety of contexts, from employment115 to
grand jury selection mechanisms 6 to immigration policy chal-
lenges. 167 In the employment discrimination context, courts have
invoked the inexorable zero in segregation cases, as well as in hir-
ing, firing, and assignment cases. A review of some of the fact
patterns and holdings in the employment discrimination context
will illustrate the types of cases in which an inexorable 100 infer-
ence could also provide adequate inferences of discrimination, but
go beyond the inexorable zero inference to open the door to at-
tack segregated jobs and substandard conditions.
164. This analysis is based on a review of cases in which the "inexorable zero" terminol-
ogy is used in describing the plaintiffs' complaint.
165. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 656-57 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977).
166. See e.g., Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 905 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (noting that a
complete absence of Hispanics, Chinese or Filipino forepersons over a thirty year period
merited closer scrutiny, including scrutiny into possible unconscious biases preventing their
selection, despite the court denying writ of habeas corpus).
167. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1495-96 (l1th Cir. 1983) (discussing the use of sta-




1. The Inexorable Zero and Barriers to Opportunity:
Ewing v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.
A typical way of utilizing inexorable zero evidence is as proof
that the employer has created a barrier to advancement opportuni-
ties. In Ewing v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of New York,'8 for example, the
plaintiffs, Black and Latino production workers at a bottling plant,
alleged that they were assigned to the least desirable jobs with the
most onerous working conditions. 69 In addition plant management
failed to train the plaintiffs for advancement into the semi-skilled
jobs in the plant."7 The Anglo workers in the plant, on the other
hand, were trained early and often so that they could quickly ad-
vance to the less onerous assignments.'
The plaintiffs focused on the inexorable zero in the more skilled
positions as evidence of both the segregated nature of the plant
and the employers' intentional disparate treatment of minority
workers. 7' The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss,
noting that the inference of discrimination resulted from:
plaintiffs' allegation that Black and Hispanic production
workers are assigned to work exclusively at the most onerous
dead-end jobs, while similar situated white production work-
ers are given the more desirable, and possibly career
enhancing machine jobs."
7 3
Arguably, in cases like this, the court already recognizes the inexo-
rable 100 condition. Thus, it would require only a small shift in the
law for courts to make an inference of discrimination from that
condition, which would allow courts to address the intentional
steering of groups of workers into dead-end jobs and to construct a
remedy for exploitive job conditions.
2. The Inexorable Zero and Promotion Practices- Loyd v. Phillips
Brothers and Capaci v. Besthoff
The inexorable zero has also been used successfully to attack
unlawful promotion practices that deny opportunities to protected
168. Ewing v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y., Inc., No. 00 CIV. 7020(CM), 2001 WL
767070 (S.D.N.Y.June 25, 2001).
169. Id. at*1-5.
170. Id. at *5.
171. Id.
172. Id. at *6.
173. Id.
WINTER 2008]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
groups. In Loyd v. Phillips Bros.,7 4 the plaintiffs challenged the
structures used by the employer to maintain a sex-segregated work-
force. 175 One of the employer's practices was to offer promotion
opportunities to males from the male-dominated department.76
Pursuant to this practice, the company went directly to male em-
ployees without posting or otherwise making the position publicly
available, either internally or externally. 77 Another practice of the
employer was segregating men and women into two separate
feeder positions that supposedly both led to higher-level positions,
but then only promoting from the male position.
The court found that the inexorable zero in the higher-level po-
sition supported a finding of disparate treatment. As the court
noted, "that Phillips' promotional procedure inexorably main-
tained the existing zero is strong evidence that it was intended to
do so.",7
Notably, the court found that the segregation itself should be
cause for scrutiny: "thel100% sex-segregated workforce is highly
suspicious and is sometimes alone sufficient to support judgment
for the plaintiff." 80 Presumably then, although not explicitly dis-
cussed in the case, the maintenance of the inexorable 100 in the
female feeder positions would also have provided evidence of dis-
crimination.
In Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff Inc., the EEOC sued Katz & Besthoff,
a pharmacy chain in Louisiana, for discrimination in its promotion
practices.18 ' The individual plaintiff was a female pharmacist who
unsuccessfully sought promotion to management within the com-
pany."" The EEOC alleged, and the appellate court agreed, that
the company discriminated against women by failing to promote
them to management trainee positions.8 3 All 267 trainee positions
were awarded to men. 84 Much of the trial centered on testimony
about whether the numbers were statistically significant.185 The evi-
dence also indicated that the company advertised for management
174. Loyd v. Phillips Bros., 25 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 1994).
175. Id. at 521.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 523-25.
178. Id. at 523-24.
179. Id. at 524 n.4.
180. Id. (citing Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 E2d 857, 867 n.7 (7th Cir. 1985); Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977)).




185. Id. at 651-56.
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positions by seeking "local men" in newspaper classified ads.
86
While acknowledging the strength of the statistics in the case, the
appellate court indicated that the zero is a much more powerful
signal of discrimination:
We cannot escape the fact that during these seven and one-
half years, there were hundreds of male manager trainees
chosen and not a single woman. The hiring record demon-
strates not just disparities in hiring, but total exclusion of
women from the entry level management position. We differ
with the defendant's suggestion that "zero is just a number."
To the noble theoretician predicting the collisions of weight-
less elephants on frictionless roller skates, zero may be just
another integer, but to us it carries special significance in dis-
cerning firm policies and attitudes. Evidence of two or three
acts of hiring women as manager trainees during this period
might not have affected the statistical significance of the tests
performed by the experts, but it would indicate at least some
willingness to consider women as equals in firm management.
Perhaps for this reason, the courts have been particularly du-
bious of attempts by employers to explain away "the
inexorable zero" when the hiring columns are totalled.
7
Thus, the court remedied the discrimination inferred from the
presence of the inexorable zero by dismantling a promotion struc-
ture that left women stranded in lower-level positions within the
pharmacy structure. A similar focus on the inexorable 100 would
have highlighted the positions into which women were tracked and
the less than desirable conditions attached to such jobs. The corre-
sponding remedy could have been different in that case, perhaps
improving wages and training in the jobs held by women and
changing the policies behind the segregation.
3. The Inexorable Zero and Termination Policies:
Barner v. City of Harvey
Barner v. City of Harvey employed the inexorable zero in the con-
text of firing.'8 The plaintiffs, a group of African Americans,
claimed that the City of Harvey laid off a hugely disproportionate
186. Id. at 659.
187. Id. at 662 (citations omitted).
188. Barner v. City of Harvey, No. 95 C 3316, 1998 WL 664951 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 1998).
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number of African Americans after the election of a new mayor.189
One hundred percent of those laid off for "budgetary reasons"
were African American.' 90 Here, the inexorable zero was identified
in the numbers of non-African Americans who were laid off. The
federal district court ruled that the plaintiffs had overcome a
summary judgment challenge with a showing of the skewed num-
bers. 91 As the court noted:
In the end, the tremendous drop in African-American pres-
ence in Harvey's workforce, both in general and across the
board, and the "inexorable zero" means that Plaintiffs, despite
their lack of statistical sophistication, have successfully shown
a prima facie case both of disparate impact and disparate
treatment.1
92
The court's focus on the composition of the laid off workers sup-
ports the concept of an inexorable 100, even if the court did not
clearly articulate it. The court stressed the importance of extremes
in demonstrating racial and ethnic imbalances that are, in turn, a
sign of discrimination. In this case, the inexorable 100 would have
been a more natural way to view the situation because framing it in
terms of an inexorable zero suggests the African Americans were
simply not given an opportunity to stay in their jobs, whereas fram-
ing it in terms of an inexorable 100 correctly reflects that African
Americans were disproportionately targeted in the layoffs.
Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co. provides yet another example of the
power of the zero, and of the potential power of the 100, in a Title
VII termination case.193 In Babrocky, the circuit court considered
sex-segregated job categories in a meat packing plant.9 4 The em-
ployer laid off a group of meat wrappers-from a mostly female
meat wrapping department-and did not similarly lay off meat
packers from the predominantly male meat packing department.9
The plaintiffs alleged that 'Jewel violated Title VII by maintaining
sex-segregated job classifications, by failing to recruit, train, trans-
fer, or promote females, by paying plaintiff women less than men
who performed comparable work, by discharging women because
of their sex, and by instituting a seniority and promotional system
189. Id. at *9.
190. Id. at *9.
191. Id. at*50.
192. Id. at *50.
193. Babrocky v.Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857 (7th Cir. 1985).
194. Id. at 859-60.
195. Id. at 860.
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to further those practices. " 196 The plaintiffs also alleged that the
company "misused an employment ratio of one meat wrapper to
four meat cutters to justify the discriminatory layoff of female em-
ployees."'9
The court held that the sex-segregated nature of the job should
trigger more scrutiny and required an analysis of the employer
practices outside of the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework.'9
The court noted the differences in hiring patterns between the
meat wrapping and meat cutting jobs, observing that one hundred
percent of meat cutters were male, and one hundred percent of
the meat wrappers were female. 199 This difference was sufficient to
support a prima facie case of discrimination. 9 While the court fo-
cused on the lack of opportunity for women that ultimately
resulted in the layoffs, it also noted that the segregation was a
symptom of that lack of opportunity.20' Had the court used an in-
exorable 100 inference, its analysis could have been more direct,
starting from the segregation, and its remedy could have addressed
not only firing and hiring, but also the policies that created the
segregation.
4. The Inexorable Zero and Hiring: EEOC v. O&G Spring and Wire
Forms Specialty Company
The inexorable zero can also support plaintiffs in hiring cases.
In EEOC v. 0 & G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty Co., the EEOC sued
202a manufacturer for its failure to hire African Americans. Over a
six-year period, the company made eighty-seven hires into one of
its low-skill departments; none of them were African Americans. 9
The trial court found the inexorable zero in the company's hiring
decisions supported a prima facie case of hiring discrimination. 4
The company appealed, arguing that the plaintiffs' statistics
were flawed, especially due to their use of the general population
as the relevant labor market.2 0 5 The circuit court affirmed, however,
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 867-69.
199. Id. at 867 n.7.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 865 n.3.
202. EEOC v. 0 & G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty Co., 38 E3d 872, 874 (7th Cir.
1994).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 878.
205. Id. at 876-77.
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concluding that the percentage of African American availability in
the labor market would have to have been much lower than it was
to yield a zero percent hiring percentage.20 6
The company also argued that the lack of African American
hires could be explained by African Americans' lack of interest in
working in a place where Polish or Spanish were spoken. 7 The
appellate court found that the argument had no support in the
evidence. 2 8 The court rejected this formulation of the interest ar-
gument, noting that such evidence would be relevant only if
"African-Americans exhibited this propensity in significantly
greater proportion to other native-born English speakers. ' '209 Only
then could an employer defend an argument of self-selection bias
on the part of African Americans.
Finally, the company argued that its exclusive hiring of immi-
grants could be explained by the fact that its relevant labor market
was composed mostly of Polish immigrants "since 0 & G offered
poor working conditions and low pay, but, as a compensating fac-
tor, did not require English."210 The district court found this
rationale unpersuasive and the appeals court affirmed "particularly
in light of testimony from 0 & G staff and application data indicat-
ing that African-Americans represented about 20% of the walk-in
applicant pool."
2
Significantly, in this case, a segregation framework approach
with an inexorable 100 inference would have had important bene-
fits beyond offering the opportunity for a broader remedy. Initially,
the EEOC could have brought this case on the theory that the em-
ployer targeted immigrants for subordination. This strategy would
have had at least three advantages. First, the poor conditions com-
bined with the absence of an English requirement would become a
focus of the inquiry because they are symptoms of the segregated
nature of the workplace. The poor conditions, in other words,
support the inference of discrimination from the one hundred
percent composition of the workforce. The poor conditions of a
job in question should be as important in anti-discrimination law as
the lack of opportunity for those seeking entry.
Second, the company's argument that the limited language abil-
ity requirement created the inexorable 100 would not justify the
existence of poor working conditions or pay-rather, it would be a
206. Id. at 878.







red flag, especially when the workforce is composed primarily of
immigrants. This is an example of how limited the current anti-
discrimination paradigm has become. Limited English proficiency
should not be a business necessity for the job in question.212 In fact,
it is one of the methods that an employer will utilize to structure a
job to attract a particular group of workers.13 An inexorable 100
inference would challenge, rather than fail in the face of, the em-
ployer's argument.
Third, an inexorable 100 inference would render the defen-
dants' interest arguments more vulnerable. A company would have
to explain why only certain groups were attracted to a job, while
other groups were repelled by it, without resorting to the poor
conditions or the absence of an English requirement as explana-
tions. There is nothing inherent in either the job or the
employees' characteristics that would explain poor conditions, the
absence of an English requirement, or the employer's hiring or
assignment practices, all of which are in the employer's control
rather than the employees'.
5. The Inexorable Zero and Assignment:
Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment Service of
Mississippi Employment Security Commission
In Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment Service, inexorable zero
evidence was introduced to support the plaintiffs' claim alleging
segregated referral and hiring practices.214 The plaintiffs chal-
lenged the Mississippi State Employment Service's practice of
honoring employer preferences for females to fill lower-paying, less
desirable positions, and males to fill more desirable positions,
where none of the positions required specific skills.15 Specifically,
the plaintiffs showed that in referrals to a major local employer,
Travenol Laboratories, women were referred exclusively to lower-
paid assembler jobs, while men were referred exclusively to higher-
paid material handlerjobs. 6 Neitherjob required special skills.217
212. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(ii) (2000) (introducing concept of
"business necessity").
213. See, e.g., 0 & G Spring & Wire, 38 F.3d at 877. This is the structure that was set up
and then defended in this case. Id.
214. Pegues v. Miss. State Employment Serv., 699 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1983).
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The court held that this imbalance alone was insufficient to es-
tablish a prima facie case if it was not also statistically significant
1 8
and ruled that the plaintiffs had to overcome any evidence that the
imbalance results from other factors.21 9 It gave little weight to evi-
dence showing the level of disproportionate classifications because
the plaintiffs failed to introduce evidence that work preferences,
experience, education, and the state of the job market did not
cause the imbalances.22 ° The court then reviewed the evidence of
the inexorable zero in terms of statistical significance. Although it
did not infer discrimination simply from the existence of an inexo-
rable zero, it did note that such evidence could be significant if
other factors, such as qualifications, were controlled for.2
Using an inexorable 100 inference, the court could still require
the plaintiffs to demonstrate the absence of other factors explain-
ing the segregation. However, it would be easier to prove
discrimination. Although the burden would not change for the
plaintiffs, it would alleviate plaintiffs of the requirement to show
qualification for other positions, which is difficult to prove in an
increasingly segmented market. It would also free plaintiffs of the
requirement to show that more desirable opportunities exist within
a department, or even a company, which itself is difficult in segre-
gated workplaces. Importantly, by doing this, it would allow courts
to recognize that certain practices generate segregated workplaces.
Each of the inexorable zero cases discussed here demonstrates
the potential power of the inexorable 100. At bottom, the inexora-
ble 100 is evidence of an extreme, just like the inexorable zero,
which courts have accepted as sufficient to support a prima facie
case for plaintiffs-one that defendants must rebut with solid evi-
dence explaining the existence of the extreme imbalance. Except
in limited cases, plaintiffs have not presented arguments from the
point of view of the inexorable 100, in part because of a historical
focus on employment opportunity as a goal or remedy. This focus
comes from a historical need to deal with the systematic exclusion
of minorities from workplace participation. An alternative focus on
the inexorable 100 could improve conditions in segregated work-
places, as a first step toward their eradication.
218. Id. at 765-66.
219. Id. at 767-68.
220. Id. at 766-67.
221. Id. at 768-69.
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D. A Potential Problem for the Inexorable 100: The Weakening of the
Inexorable Zero Inference
It is important to note that over time the inexorable zero infer-
ence has experienced some dilution.222  In the majority of
discrimination cases, it still remains a powerful inference, 2 3 but as
discussed above, there is currently a circuit split regarding the
proper significance of the inexorable zero. Some of the circuits
have retreated from recognizing the strong inference of discrimi-
nation in the case of the zero and have instead attempted to merge
it into statistical disparity analysis, focusing on the diagnostic value
of the zero in comparison to other forms of statistical analysis.
2 24
222. See, e.g., Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 457 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he mere absence of
minority employees is not enough to constitute a prima facie case of discrimination."); Craik
v. Minn. State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 494 (8th Cir. 1984) ("[Z]ero is not always 'inexora-
ble.'").
223. SeeJordan v. Wilson, 649 F. Supp. 1038, 1060 (M.D. Ala. 1986) (accepting evidence
of inexorable zero in promotions to higher ranks in police force as prima facie showing of
discrimination); Calloway v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 642 F. Supp. 663, 696 (M.D. Ga.
1986) (holding that inexorable zero evidence and evidence of subjective promotion prac-
tices demonstrated that company discriminated against Blacks); EEOC v. Local 798, United
Ass'n of Journeymen, 646 F. Supp. 318, 325 (N.D. Okla. 1986) (finding that union failed to
rebut evidence of inexorable zero women or minorities in union local's membership); Vea-
zie v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., Civil Action No. 72-2729, 1983 WL 677, at "9-11 (E.D. La. Nov.
8, 1983) (accepting inexorable zero evidence that Greyhound had maintained black and
white departments in its terminals and garages); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Delmonte,
553 E Supp. 601, 610 n.14 (D. Conn. 1982) (noting that Black and Latino officers success-
fully showed the existence of segregated assignment practices and units by demonstrating an
inexorable zero assignment rate for minorities in low-crime areas); Monroe v. United Air
Lines, Inc., No. 79 C 360, 1981 WL 268, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 1981) (denying summary
judgment because evidence of inexorable zero in transfer rates for pilots over age sixty pro-
vided sufficient evidence to present case, despite paucity of other statistics); United States v.
San Diego County, Civil Action No. 76-1094-S, 1979 WL 269, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 6, 1979)
("The gross disparity between the number of positions filled by white males as compared
with minorities and women supports plaintiffs' primafacie case and creates an inference of
discrimination especially where the historic figures for promotion of blacks, Mexican-
American/Latinos and even women, approach the 'inexorable zero."').
224. See Note, supra note 154, at 1226-27; see also Capruso v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group,
Inc., No. 01 Civ.4250(RLC), 2003 WL 1872653, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2003) (refusing to
allow plaintiff to rely on inexorable zero inference with respect to a subgroup of a protected
group, in this case women with children, and instead focusing on statistical evidence and
flaws in comparator categories); Jordan v. Shaw Indus., Inc., No. 6:93CV542, 1996 WL
1061687, at *10 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 13, 1996) ("Without evidence of the relevant labor pool,
Jordan's 'inexorable zero' evidence is insufficient, standing alone, to show discriminatory
motive on the part of Shaw Industries."), aff'd, 131 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 1997); EEOC v. Turtle
Creek Mansion Corp., Civ. No. 3:93-CV-1649-H, 1995 WL 478833, at *9-11 (N.D. Tex. May
18, 1995) (finding inexorable zero evidence insufficient to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination because defendant's hiring numbers were too small, and employer testified
that women were underrepresented in the waitstaff profession in the area), aff'd, 82 F.3d 414
(5th Cir. 1996); Csicseri v. Bowsher, 862 F. Supp. 547, 573 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding that inexo-
rable zero evidence of employer's failure to appoint anyone over age fifty to high level
positions was outweighed by evidence of few appointments), aff'd, 67 F.3d 972 (D.C. Cir.
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Even in these circuits, however, the inexorable zero still has the
value of providing at the very least, some evidence of discrimina-
tion that requires a response from the employer.1"
The inexorable 100 likewise may be eroded or even initially con-
sidered in light of its statistical power relative to other statistical
analysis. However, the evolution of the inexorable zero suggests
that even if that were to be the case, the inexorable 100 would still
have value.
IV. TOWARD A SEGREGATION FRAMEWORK
A segregation framework centered on an inexorable 100 infer-
ence of discrimination is the necessary and appropriate step to
take in anti-discrimination law to address segregation in the brown
collar workplace. By focusing on segregation when scrutinizing
employment practices, the legal system could effectuate the goals
of Title VII, namely to eliminate poor working conditions for pro-
tected groups. This Part demonstrates why a segregation
framework would be effective in countering modern segregation
and then sets out the framework in detail.
1995); EEOC v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 753 E Supp. 452, 466-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (deciding that
inexorable zero inference was weakened by limited number of openings for sports director
positions, which female employee sought), affd, 940 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1991); EEOC v. An-
drew Corp., No. 81 C 4359, 1989 WL 32884, at *20-21 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 1989) (determining
that, while the inexorable zero was relevant for Black clerical workers compared to their
labor force numbers, the same was not true for Hispanic clerical workers, whose labor forces
numbers were much smaller); Presseisen v. Swarthmore Coll., 442 E Supp. 593, 625 (E.D.
Pa. 1977) (concluding that female professor failed to show existence of inexorable zero
when she did not provide adequate labor pool numbers), afffd, 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1978);
GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw: VISIONS OF EQUALITY IN THE-
ORY AND DOCTRINE, 59-60 (2001) (describing the inexorable zero as a common sense test
used where the court finds "no need to rely on even elementary tests of statistical signifi-
cance.").
225. See Note, supra note 154, at 1226; see alsoVictory v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 34 F. Supp.
2d 809, 823 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("The complete lack of female participation in management is
highly persuasive evidence of a disparate impact claim."); United States v. City of Belleville,
No. 93CV0799-PER, 1995 WL 1943014, at *4 n.2 (S.D. Il. Aug. 8, 1995) (noting that regard-
less of definition of relevant labor market in statistical comparisons, "[t]he inexorable-zero
provides sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case."); EEOC v. Costello, 850 F. Supp.
74, 77 (D. Mass. 1994) (finding that plaintiffs carried burden of showing prima facie case of
discrimination where no Blacks or Hispanics were hired for unskilled steamship clerk posi-
tions over several years), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union,
Local 1066, 48 F.3d 594, 603 (1st Cir. 1995); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp.
847, 869-70 (D. Minn. 1993) (scrutinizing employer's reasons for failure to promote women
in mining company in response to inexorable zero evidence).
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A. Why a Segregation Model?
A segregation framework provides an opportunity to eradicate
the subordinating practices associated with low-wage industries that
have repelled native born workers and trapped immigrant workers.
Such a framework may also be more effective than the current anti-
discrimination paradigms at targeting poor working conditions in
an increasingly segmented market, where the problem is not get-
ting into the workplace, but getting out of segregated jobs.
Moreover, a segregation framework avoids pitting workers against
each other and will allow workers-both those hired and those re-
jected-to join together to create more desirable jobs. This section
discusses each of these reasons for establishing a segregation
model in anti-discrimination law.
1. Workplace Segregation as a Subordinating Practice
Segregation in the brown collar workplace should properly be
viewed as an extension of the historical subordination of Latinos in
U.S. society. Employer targeting of Latino immigrants for the most
difficult, least desirable jobs because of their perceived work ethic
is analogous to taking advantage of a group's social condition be-
cause of racial difference. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized this
in Hernandez v. Texas.226 At the time of that case, Jim Crow legisla-
tion often took the form of language or cultural restrictions, which
inevitably were tied to race.2 2 7 The Jim Crow system in practice,
however, was more nuanced. In some cases, state and private prac-
tices classified by perceived language ability, which resulted in the
segregation of Mexicans and Mexican Americans.228 In others, state
actors implemented policies that excluded Latinos from partici-
pation in a way that precluded them from claiming
229discrimination. In Hernandez, for example, the plaintiffs allegedthat state policies alternately defined Mexicans as white or
226. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
227. ArielaJ. Gross, "The Caucasian Cloak": Mexican Americans and the Politics of Whiteness
in the Twentieth-Century Southwest, 95 GEO. L.J. 337, 354-60 (2007).
228. Id. at 338.
229. Id. at 340-42 (arguing that Mexican Americans were "covered with the Caucasian
cloak" in order to exclude them from participating on juries, on the theory that since they
were considered white and whites served on juries, they could not claim equal protection
violations); see also Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 479 (noting that while the challenged statute was
neutral on its face, it could be applied in a discriminatory manner, and therefore, "[tihe
petitioner's initial burden in substantiating his charge of group discrimination was to prove
that persons of Mexican descent constitute a separate class ... distinct from 'whites.' ").
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non-white, depending on the situation, in order to exclude them.30
The novelty of their argument was that they framed the issue of
segregatory practices to be not so much the categorization by race
but "subordinat[ion of] groups based upon ideas of racial differ-
ence." 13 In Hernandez, Mexicans were considered white for jury
selection purposes, but they were treated as a separate subordi-
nated class in other respects. 232 As legal scholar Ian Haney Lopez
noted in his analysis of the importance of Hernandez in the struggle
against segregation, "Hernandez unambiguously insists, in a way that
Brown [v. Board of Education] does not, that it is race as subordina-
tion, rather than race per se, that demands constitutional
intervention."
2 3
The lesson of Hernandez-that anti-discrimination law should be
concerned more with subordination than with classification-
reaches beyond the narrow context of this case. In Hernandez,
Chief Justice Warren dealt with what was essentially race or na-
tional origin discrimination as a group subordination issue. In
reasoning through that issue, the court stated: "community preju-
dices are not static, and from time to time other differences from
the community norm may define other groups which need the
same protection. Whether such a group exists ... is a question of
fact." 2 ' Thus, as formulated by Haney Lopez, the test to determine
whether a group deserves constitutional protection is: "[i]n the
context of the local situation, was the group mistreated?"2 3 In Her-
nandez, it was Mexicans' subordination in the context of their mid-
century lives, rather than their race, that required protection. To-
day it is subordination in the context of a restrictive immigration
law regime and a weak employment and labor enforcement
framework.
Following Hernandez, and departing from the current disparate
treatment and impact paradigms, a segregation framework makes
subordination rather than classification the critical issue of the
anti-discrimination inquiry. Therefore, the question under a segre-
gation framework is whether the employer is subjecting brown
collar workers to worse pay and less desirable conditions based on
their race or ethnicity, as opposed to whether an employer used
race classifications in making employment decisions.
230. Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 479.
231. Haney Lopez, supra note 140, at 75-76; see also Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 479-80.
232. Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 479.
233. Haney Lopez, supra note 140, at 62.
234. Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 478.
235. Haney Lopez, supra note 140, at 66-67.
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2. The New Labor Market
Today's labor market is increasingly segmented, contingent, and
unstable. Jobs are specialized, leaving little opportunity for pre-
dictable advancement on a career ladder within a company. Legal
scholar Katherine Stone describes the "new psychological con-
tract," or the "new deal at work," as one in which "the long-
standing assumption of long-term attachment between an em-
ployee and a single firm has broken down."236 In the modern
workplace, a worker's identity is linked to their skills, and employ-
ers discourage employees from expecting long-term job security.
2 7
This is a dramatic change from the past. Title VII and New Deal
labor legislation were formulated in an era when the predominant
method of advancement was within a single company over a long
period of time. Workers thought of their jobs as stable and did
not move out of them.3 9 In that context, segregation was about ex-
cluding minorities from advancement tracks or particular jobs in a
240company.
As Katherine Stone argues, today's labor and employment laws
reflect the employment reality of a different era:
The labor and employment laws we have inherited from the
New Deal were built upon the template of an employment
relationship characterized by internal labor markets-an em-
ployment system that offered long-term attachment between
the employee and the firm in which the employee advances
up the job ladder of a particular employer for most of his or
her working life. Thus the labor law regime was compatible
with and tailored to the job structures of the industrial era.241
236. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS, supra note 2, at 3.
237. Id. at 124-26.
238. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000); Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical
Employees: Employment Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27
BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 253 (2006) [hereinafter Legal Protections for Atypical Employ-
ees] (explaining employment trends toward contingent, temporary labor forces); see also
Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, supra note 62, at 458 n.222 (describing the breadth of Title
VII with respect to employment opportunity); Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizen-
ship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 582 (2007) (commenting on the role of worker centers in
increasingly unstable labor markets).
239. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS, supra note 2, at 68; DEMETRIOS G. PAPADE-
METRIOU & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, BALANCING INTERESTS: RETHINKING U.S. SELECTION OF
SKILLED IMMIGRANTS 17, 20-21 (1996).
240. See Goluboff, supra note 8, at 1478-80, 1482.
241. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS, supra note 2, at ix.
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In sum, labor laws are still focused on strengthening the internal
labor market and reflect the expectation of long-term employment
relationships, and employment laws continue to focus on providing
opportunities for minorities and women to break into, not out of,
job categories. Traditional labor law, moreover, protects insiders,
not outsiders-minorities and women. Benefit negotiations center
on length of service, seniority and long vesting periods.242 Collec-
tive bargaining contracts include just-cause and seniority provisions
in order to protect the long-term employment paradigm.243 In her
analysis of historical labor regulation trends, Katherine Stone
writes:
[t] he labor laws and the employment practices of large firms
reinforced a sharp divide between those inside and those out-
side the corporate family. Insiders benefited from the
collective bargaining laws and the implicit job security of the
internal labor market; outsiders had neither.2"
In the absence of labor union protections for "outsiders," fed-
eral legislation, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
Occupational Health and Safety Act, the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification ("WARN") Act, and similar state statutes
have become the default protections for these workers.43 Similarly,
employment discrimination laws, such as Title VII, the Equal Pay
Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, have protected the rights
of women and minorities in the workplace in ways that traditional
labor regulation could not.246 Yet, even these laws are not helpful in
the current labor market. As Katherine Stone notes, anti-
discrimination laws:
provided a mechanism for orderly, rule-based, and account-
able decisions about such matters as hiring, promotions, and
pay rates. These rule-based systems injected an external order
into the otherwise private and often anarchic domain of the
workplace. In particular, equal employment laws provided
242. See NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR
206-09 (2002).
243. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS, supra note 2, at 121-122.
244. Id. at 121.
245. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 242, at 206-11.
246. Legal Protectionsfor Atypical Employees, supra note 238, at 262.
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rules by which women and minorities could break into work-
places that had been white, male, privileged clubs.247
The problem today, however, is not so much that minorities cannot
break into the workplace, given the rules that have developed in
employment and labor law.2 48 The problem in the current labor
market is that they cannot break out of segregation-an old-style
problem. In other words, while the individualist labor protection
paradigm helps protected groups of workers break into jobs, it
does not provide the collective protections that traditionally have
helped improve workplace conditions.
Similarly, the era in which labor and employment law developed
influenced the manner in which the disparate impact and dispa-
rate treatment discrimination frameworks developed and grew.
The focus in a discrimination case was nearly always advancement
opportunities based on the assumption that this remedy offered a
249way out of segregated conditions for minorities and women.
These assumptions fell in line with the broader civil rights aspira-
tion to eradicate segregation at all levels of society.250 In the
traditional civil rights models,
civil rights enforcement efforts were initially directed at cor-
porate hiring and compensation practices in order to obtain
equal pay and access to jobs for women and minorities. But it
quickly became apparent that women and minorities needed
not simply jobs, but good jobs....
In an era of promotional ladders within firms, it was logical
and appropriate for Title VII plaintiffs to seek remedies that
gave women and minorities access to the upper rungs of the
promotion ladders....
Title VII remedies for employment discrimination were tai-
lored to redress discrimination within firms that utilized
internal labor markets. Affirmative action and requirements
that firms promulgate goals and timetables for measuring
247. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS, supra note 2, at 168.
248. See Sturm, supra note 23, at 461-62 ("Efforts to reduce the uncertainty of general
and ambiguous legal norms by articulating more specific and detailed rules produce a dif-
ferent but equally problematic result. Specific commands will not neatly adapt to variable
and fluid contexts. Inevitably, they will be underinclusive, overinclusive, or both.").
249. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66;
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203 (1979).
250. Goluboff, supra note 8, at 1479-80.
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their compliance with equal employment objectives helped
numerous women and minorities gain access to previously
segregated workplaces and helped them move up within the
firm. However, the remedies assumed that there were identifi-
able job ladders that defined advancement opportunities
within firms, and operated to move women and minorities up
within them.25'
Today, the advancement mechanisms within a company are not
so clear. In addition to segmented job structures, companies have
turned to multiple job categories and titles, contingent hiring, and
team-style work models-all of which affect how a discrimination
lawsuit will fare under the traditional models. 52
The evolving labor structure necessitates consideration as to how
discrimination may occur in these different scenarios and develop
frameworks that fit them. The discrimination that most affects
brown collar workers is old-fashioned segregation manifested in
the new form of the segmented labor market. A segregation
framework would enable plaintiffs to reach this discrimination. Be-
cause the focus is on the segregated job and not on opportunities
for advancement, it does not require a comparison to similarly
situated employees that in the new labor market, like in Wards Cove,
do not exist.
3. Uniting Workers, Putting the Focus on Employers
The current discrimination frameworks tend to pit workers
against each other and distract from the core issue: employer poli-
cies and practices that perpetuate segregation. A recent case,
Colindres v. Quietfex Mfg., provides an illustration.253 In Houston, a
group of Latino workers filed suit against a manufacturing com-
pany alleging discrimination in its hiring, assignment, and
promotion policies.254 The Latinos, the vast majority of whom were
immigrants, worked in department 911, a segregated entry-level
department that assembled the air conditioning ducts.25 Another
entry-level department, 910, produced the jackets for the ducts.256
251. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS, supra note 2, at 182-83.
252. Id. at 2-4.







It was populated mostly by Vietnamese workers.257 Department 911
employees, unskilled workers, performed the most difficult, dirty,
and lowest paid work in the plant.258 Department 910 employees,
also unskilled workers, performed more desirable work, for better
pay.259 Structural requirements such as a transfer policy that re-
quired English to transfer to the more desirable department (but
not vice versa), a six-month transfer requirement, and a policy or
practice that forced transferees to transfer into less desirable shifts
kept the Latino workers segregated in department 911.260
Although the Vietnamese workers arguably were as segregated as
the Latino workers in the sense that they, too, were isolated from
other workers, the current discrimination frameworks required the
Latino plaintiffs to articulate their legal claims in a manner that
placed the Latino and Vietnamese workers on opposite sides of the
suit. The Latino plaintiffs had to show that their conditions were
substantially worse than those of the Vietnamese workers, and that
their prospects for advancement were diminished by the em-
ployer's structural requirements. 261  These frameworks also
prevented the Vietnamese workers from easily joining with the La-
tino workers to combat structural practices that affected both sets
of workers, such as antiquated piece-rate systems, seniority systems
that kept both sets of workers in entry level positions, and intra-




By forcing the plaintiffs to focus on the employees' situations vis-
k-vis each other, the available anti-discrimination frameworks re-
quired the employees to focus on the targeted jobs and the groups
that held them, rather than on the conditions that maintained the
segregation and the exploitative conditions-some of which also
existed in the Vietnamese department. In other words, it was not
enough to show segregation per se. The plaintiffs had to show the
detrimental effects of the segregation by pointing to a comparator
employee group that had more desirable work conditions. Instead





261. Id. at *4; Marion'v. Slaughter Co., No. 98-6286, 1999 WL 1267015, at *5-6 (10th
Cir. Dec. 29, 1999) (finding segregation in itself was not sufficient to sustain a Title VII dis-
crimination claim).
262. Colindres, 2004 WL 3690215, at *1, *2. Practices such as piece-rate wages and Eng-
lish language transfer requirements are structural in that they create the parameters within
which a worker will operate on the job. SeeSaucedo, supra note 11, at 977-978. They are the
means by which an employer creates ajob so that no one else will be interested in it. Id.
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employer policies and practices were simply a backdrop to the
broader issue of whether one group or another held the desired
positions. An anti-discrimination paradigm that focuses on differ-
ential treatment rather than on the ways in which a particular
group can be subordinated tends to foster division rather than
unity among minority groups in the workplace.
Moreover, in anti-discrimination law, the focus on the compara-
tive positions of employee groups inevitably leads to an inquiry as
to whether the challenging parties possess "qualifications" for the
targeted jobs, which is one element of an individual disparate
treatment claim.2 63 Because of its anti-classification nature, this in-
quiry risks creating long-term animosity between groups of workers
who perceive that they are competing with each other for their
jobs.2 64 The targeted job and its composition then becomes the
relevant inquiry. In a legal culture increasingly dominated by color-
blind, anti-classification equal protection principles, 65 the focus on
targeted jobs as the remedy for exploitative employer practices
simply re-creates a zero-sum environment that can spiral into dec-
ades of litigation over the desired job.
The Hurricane Katrina disaster provides an example of how
employer practices pit workers against each other. In immigration
law, employment-based visas are supposed to be granted only if
they do not otherwise create entry or advancement barriers for
willing native-born workers. 66 This system stems from the popular
public perception that the U.S. government should not allow im-
migrant workers coming into the United States to take jobs away
from willing U.S. workers.2 67 This policy is overly simplistic because
263. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,802 (1973).
264. This has been the case in the affirmative action cases, for example, in which em-
ployers responding to perceived exclusionary practices are then sued by Anglo or male
plaintiffs. See, e.g.,Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 619-20 (1987) (hearing claim of
employment discrimination by male after female promoted pursuant to an affirmative ac-
tion plan).
265. See, e.g., Johnson, 480 U.S. at 641-642 (promoting a female employee over a male
employee with higher interview scores did not violate Title VII because sex was only one of
many factors in the Agency's affirmative action plan). See generally Reva B. Siegel, Equality
Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117
HARV. L. REv. 1470 (2004).
266. The labor certification process determines whether there are not sufficient work-
ers who are able, willing, qualified, and available at the time of the visa application, and
ensures that the employment of an immigrant will not adversely affect the wages and work-
ing conditions of native born workers. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a) (5) (A), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A) (2000). Similar provisions exist to determine if an alien is labeled
"nonimmigrant alien." Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(H)(i)-(ii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a) (15) (H) (i)-(ii).
267. Media accounts tend to play up this perception. See, e.g., Stephanie Chavez, Racial
Tensions Over South L.A. Jobs Grow, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 1992, at BI; Darryl Fears, Job Issue
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it ignores the demonstrated ability of employers to structure a job
so that no native-born worker will want it. The governmental pol-
icy, therefore, unnecessarily pits one set of workers against another.
Under Title VII law, the workers who are entering the job market
for the newly restructured jobs do not have a cause of action, while
the workers who do not get hired into the jobs, have little interest
in fighting for them.
A segregation framework, by contrast, would unite workers in-
stead of driving them apart, and would put the focus where it
should be-on employers. This is because, again, a segregation
framework would not require comparator evidence as the focus
would be on the segregated job and the employer practices creat-
ing it, and both workers targeted for an undesirable job as well as
those excluded from it have the incentive to challenge the em-
ployer practices. The potential of a segregation framework to bring
together all workers was illustrated by immigrants' rights groups
that recently sued a hotel owner in New Orleans on behalf of im-
migrant guest workers from Peru, Bolivia, and the Dominican
Republic. 26 The lawsuit highlighted how an employer used the H-2
temporary worker system to exploit immigrant workers even as it
failed to hire local workers, including African Americans. 269 The
lawsuit claimed that hotel owners violated the Fair Labor Standards
Act and other labor laws when they lured immigrant workers into
jobs at lower pay and in worse conditions than existed when the
native Louisianans held them.270 Lawyers for the workers explained
that the "lawsuit illustrates how U.S. businesses systematically
recruit and exploit vulnerable immigrants to drive down wages and
undercut worker rights. 2 7' The suit alleged that the hotel owners
lured workers to New Orleans through labor recruiters, who
Muddles Immigration Views, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2006, at A03, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/O
7 /AR200 6 0 40701579.html;
M.L. Ingram, Are Undocumented Immigrants Taking Jobs from Blacks?, PAC. NEWS SERVICE, Apr.
10, 2006, http://news.pacificnews.org/news/view-article.html?article_id=370fa6cabebbd4
fbe63259c57f0ae571. For an in-depth discussion of the tensions between the black commu-
nity and the Latino immigrant community around perceived work-related tensions, see
Jennifer Gordon & R. A. Lenhardt, Citizenship Talk: Bridging the Gap Between Immigration and
Race Perspectives, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2493, 2511-19 (2007).
268. Complaint, Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, L.L.C, 488 F. Supp. 2d 565
(E.D. La. 2007) (No. 06-4340), 2006 WL 2705205, https://secure.splcenter.org/pdf/
dynamic/legal/DecaturAmendedComplaint.pdf; S. Poverty Law Ctr., SPLC Exposes Ex-
ploitation of Immigrant Workers (Aug. 16, 2006), https://secure.splcenter.org/legal/
news/article.jsp?aid=205&site-area-l.
269. Id.
270. Complaint, supra note 268, at 7-8 (describing how defendant hotel owners failed
to pay immigrant workers the applicable minimum wage).
271. S. Poverty Law Ctr., supra note 268.
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promised high wages, stable jobs and good living conditions in the
U.S.2 2 The recruiters charged workers $3,500 to $5,000 each to
transport them to New Orleans and secure their visas through the
273H-2B temporary worker program. In order to qualify to hire
temporary workers, hotel owners had to certify that they could not
find U.S. workers to take these jobs. 7" The hotel claimed in its cer-
tification that it offered jobs to Katrina evacuees but no one
applied. 75
Once they arrived in New Orleans, the guest workers questioned• • • • 276
the absence of African Americans in their workplaces. Hotel own-
ers claimed that "black people don't like to work."277 By seeking
enforcement of whatever rights immigrant workers have under
current law, these workers aimed to become allies of African
American workers. The development of an inexorable 100 infer-
ence and a segregation framework surely would advance that
effort. Further, the inference can complement the efforts of immi-
grant rights advocates to highlight the dangers of segregating any
workers-including immigrant or temporary workers-into low-
status jobs.
To make the employer's policies and practices the true focus of
the inquiry into whether the creation of an exploitative workplace
environment creates unlawful discrimination, the law of employ-
ment discrimination needs a framework that scrutinizes the
indicators of exploitation as a form of discrimination, without re-
gard to whether a comparable set of similarly situated employees
278exists. The proposed segregation framework gives the employee
in the job as much standing to sue for conditions as if there were
other workers on the job. It provides the potential for the "weak"
winners on the job to join with the "strong" losers-native born
workers-for better working conditions and a more desirable job.
4. The New Discrimination-Targeting
As today's labor market differs from the labor market present
when existing discrimination law and frameworks were developed,
272. Complaint, supra note 268, at 1-2.
273. Id.
274. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § ll01(a)(15)(H)(ii)
(2000).
275. S. Poverty Law Ctr., supra note 268.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Title VII conditions cases and wage discrimination cases have attempted this scru-
tiny, although not explicitly, as discussed infra Parts II.B and C.
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today's discrimination also differs from the discrimination of that
era. Rather than strictly excluding minority employees from oppor-
tunities, employers today specifically target minorities for low-wage,
undesirable jobs.2 7 9 The current segregation narrative that de-
scribes the discrimination harm as exclusion from opportunity
cannot respond to the discrimination attendant to targeting. This
is in part because the traditional approach to segregation in
Brown-that segregation is a harm that, in and of itself, violates
Equal Protection principles-has been transformed over time into
a classification principle.28° Under this transformed paradigm, seg-
regation is defined as a classification based on race, which itself
violates the Equal Protection clause. When the classification prin-
ciple becomes unlinked from a subordination principle, however,
differential treatment analysis fails to capture exploitative practices
in brown collar workplaces. Employers can, for example, much
more easily explain away segregation with a legitimate reason for
their targeting. Legal scholar Reva Siegel argues that this transfor-
mation occurred in part because the harm analysis was susceptible
to corruption by those who argued that integration was, in fact,
more harmful than segregation.281 Classification thus became a way
of "insulating a body of constitutional law concerned with status
harm inflicted on blacks against unremitting charges of jurispru-
dential illegitimacy."28 2 Siegel points out that in the decade after
Brown was decided, "questions of anti-classification and questions
of group status harm were not bifurcated frames of analysis, as they
would later come to be. Anti-classification discourse acquired this
new significance only as it was asked to solve a variety of new ques-
tions .... ,,28 As the Supreme Court began to address new issues
like anti-miscegenation statutes, for example, the equal protection
framework began to focus more on classification than on the harm
of segregation.8 4 In fact, a series of arguments attacked both the
anti-classification and harm frameworks, so that "[w]hen courts
justified disestablishment of segregation in the language of harm,
critics attacked judicial decrees in the language of harm. As judges
began to justify disestablishment of segregation in the language of
classification, opponents of desegregation decrees and policies ex-
pressed their objections in terms of the anticlassification principle
279. Saucedo, supra note 11, at 964-66.
280. Haney Lopez, supra note 140, at 69-74; Siegel, supra note 265, at 1499.
281. Siegel, supra note 265, at 1499.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1500.
284. Id. at 1502.
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itself.",2 15 Siegel sums up the eventual bifurcation of the anti-
classification and harm principles as follows:
[I]n the years after the Supreme Court first announced the
presumption that state action classifying on the basis of race
was unconstitutional, courts applied that presumption in ac-
cordance with an understanding, sometimes implicit and
sometimes explicit, that its purpose was to dismantle segrega-
tion and other practices that enforced racial hierarchy. In this
period, segregation was understood as wrongful both because
it failed to treat members of a group as individuals and be-
cause it treated one group as inferior to another, and there
was little felt sense that expressing segregation's harm in
terms of a presumption that racial classification was unconsti-
tutional amounted to a choice between the accounts of the
harm.... But in time, as the struggle over desegregation un-
folded and shifted away from the question of whether courts
would intervene in segregation to the question of when and
how, the meaning of the presumption came to be increasingly
contested.2 6
The problem is that the classification principle undermines the
anti-subordination principles on which Brown, Hernandez, and simi-
lar cases were based.2 8 7 As a result, the current discrimination
paradigms cannot adequately address the new breed of discrimina-
tion. In the context of modern discrimination, where
subordination occurs in targeting Latinos for jobs rather than de-
nying them opportunity, there is a need for a framework that can
combine the anti-classification and anti-subordination principles
into one unified theory. A segregation framework would achieve
this first, by setting up a presumption of discrimination in cases
where the inexorable 100 exists; second, by allowing courts to scru-
tinize employer practices for further signs of exploitative working
conditions; third, by setting up a legal mechanism that signals dis-
crimination whenever employment structures such as English
language proficiency or weakened pay rates perpetuate segrega-
tion; and fourth, by providing broader remedies for improving
work conditions in the targeted segregated job.
285. Id. at 1520.
286. Id. at 1534.
287. Id. at 1473 n.10.
[VOL. 41:2
Addressing Segregation
B. The Proposed Framework
A segregation framework would center on the inexorable 100 in-
ference. This focus would create the opportunity for remedies that
could reach the re-segregation occurring in today's workplaces.
The traditional remedy of opening up opportunities for advance-
ment is now less effective than eliminating the structures that
create segregation in the first place and remedying conditions in
the unskilled and semi-skilled jobs that scholars argue are struc-
tured now into segmented labor markets. 288 Title VII's remedial
powers are broad enough to permit such remedies as long as the
issue is approached with the segregation framework as a starting
point.28
9
1. The Prima Facie Case: The Existence of an Inexorable 100
The core of a segregation framework would be an inference of
discrimination from the existence of an inexorable 100, the one
hundred percent minority composition of a workforce. An inexo-
rable 100, possibly bolstered by additional evidence of
discrimination, would lead to scrutiny of employer practices to de-
termine whether a historically protected class is being
discriminated against. For example, in the case of a brown collar
workplace, the inference created by the inexorable 100 would ex-
pose the employer to an evaluation of whether it illegally targeted
brown collar workers for "unwanted" jobs. As discussed, in the in-
exorable zero context courts pay particularly close attention to the
fact of an absence of minorities among the targeted job regardless
of the type of claim.29° With a promotion claim, the focus of the
inquiry is on the promotion job category. With a termination case,
the focus of the inquiry is on the employees who were not termi-
nated. The inexorable zero carries powerful probative value in
each of these scenarios. The inexorable 100 can and should per-
form the same function in examining modern workplaces.
288. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS, supra note 2, at 3, 8.
289. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, supra note 62, at 492; see also Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
290. See supra notes 167-170 and accompanying text.
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a. "Inexorability" and Degree
Like the inexorable zero, an inexorable 100 inference relies on
common sense rather than statistical tests. To meet the requisites
of the inference, plaintiffs would need to address both the inexo-
rability of the situation and the degree of the segregation.
Inexorability is defined as something "[n]ot capable of being
persuaded by entreaty; relentless. 2 91 Arguably, just as with the zero,• 11 292
not every 100% is inexorable. Proof of inexorability may require
a review of longitudinal data to establish that a practice is deep-
seated.9  Longitudinal data can show trends in segregation and can
reveal long-standing overrepresentation of a protected group in a
less desirable job. Longitudinal analyses of wage determinations
may also provide long-term data needed to prove inexorability.
294
291. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 896 (4th ed.
2000), available at http://www.bartleby.com/61/26/I0122600.html.
292. SeeCraik v. Minn. State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 494-95 (8th Cir. 1984).
The plaintiffs argue that the women candidates' loss in all five of these elections con-
stitutes the 'inexorable zero' found so damning in Teanuters. But zero is not always
'inexorable.' The Teamsters zero was observed after hundreds of hiring decisions, a re-
sult that was surely statistically significant. The disparity observed in this case, by
contrast, is not statistically significant. The candidates in the five elections included
fifty men and eight women. If all of these candidates were pooled and chance were
the sole determinant of outcome we would expect women to win .69 of the five posi-
tions; the standard deviation is 2.63; and the observed outcome-zero--is .26
standard deviations from the expected outcome. The probability that the observed
outcome occurred purely by chance is about 40% under a one-tailed test, or about
80% under a two-tailed test-far higher than the level at which a social scientist
would become suspicious so as to deem the result statistically significant. In reality, of
course, there was not simply a single pool of fifty-eight candidates for five positions;
in some of the individual contests the women candidates were not as outnumbered as
in others. Even if we assume, however, that each of the elections was a contest be-
tween one man and one woman the results would not be startling. In that case we
would expect women to win 2.5 of the positions; the standard deviation would be
1.58; and the observed outcome would be 1.58 standard deviations from the ex-
pected. The probability of the observed outcome occurring by chance would be
between 5% and 10% under a one-tailed test, or between 10% an d 20% under a two-
tailed test. Thus, even if we focus only on the contested elections in which women
competed against men, rather than on all contested elections, as the magistrate did,
and as the majority finds improper, we do not observe enough statistical disparity to
make us suspect discrimination.
Id. (SwygertJ., dissenting).
293. See Leticia M. Saucedo, The Browning of the American Workplace: Protecting Workers in
Increasingly Latino-ized Occupations, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 303, 324-25 (2004).
294. See Cooper v. Southern Co., 205 ER.D. 596 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (holding that plaintiffs
failed to establish historical context of zero appointments to union representative position).
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Inexorability also may require evidence of the numbers affected
by the employer's decision-making. 95 In EEOC v. 0 & G Spring &
Wire Forms Specialty Co., dissenting justice Manion wrote:
Where a zero may be inexorable when such a large work force
is involved, it is not when the work force is so small. Moreover,
where, as here, the 100% work force is statistically explain-
able, the absence of a certain race or gender is alone
insufficient to support a finding of intentional discrimina-
tion.26
As this shows, plaintiffs must be careful where small numbers of
decisions are involved, as they may similarly tend to counterbal-
297ance the inexorability of the situation.
b. Supplemental Evidence of Employer Discrimination: Other Indicators
of Exploitation as Evidence of Actionable Segregation
As described earlier, the fact of segregation currently bolsters
other elements of discriminatory practice. Under a segregation
framework, it would be appropriate to look to evidence indicating
discrimination to support the inexorable 100 inference. For exam-
ple, evidence of longer hours, higher productivity requirements,
lower wage rates based on who holds the jobs, and substandard
safety conditions could all help support the prima facie segregation
case.
Further, courts are increasingly requiring supplemental statisti-
cal evidence of gross imbalances where plaintiffs allege inexorable
295. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337 (1977); see also EEOC v.
O & G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty Co., 38 F.3d 872, 889 (7th Cir. 1994) (Manion, J.,
dissenting) ("Where a zero may be inexorable when such a large work force is involved, it is
not when the work force is so small."). Some courts have also held that the inexorable zero
cannot be used to support individual or non-pattern and practice claims, especially when
the numbers involved are small. See, e.g., Davis v. Precoat Metals, 328 F. Supp. 2d 847, 856
(N.D. Ill. 2004); Clark v. ALFA Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 00-AR-3296-S, 2002 WL 32366291, at *2
(N.D. Ala. May 28, 2002).
296. 0 & G Spring & Wire, 38 F.3d at 889.
297. See Coble v. Hot Springs Sch. Dist. No. 6, 682 F.2d 721, 734 (8th Cir. 1982) (hold-
ing in sex discrimination suit that a small number of decisions made it more difficult to infer
discrimination, especially since a number of the positions were awarded to women); Davis,
328 F Supp. 2d at 856 (finding that in the absence of a pattern and practice case, and with
evidence of only three instances of disparate impact, plaintiffs could not rely on inexorable
zero to provide inference of discrimination). The court in Davis, comparing the case to
Barnerv. City of Harvey, No. 95 C 3316, 1998 WL 664951 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 1998), noted that
"[u]nlike Barner, this case involves a difference between zero and three, not zero and 68."
Davis, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 856.
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zero evidence. The same should be expected with an inexorable
100 inference. In jurisdictions where evidence of an inexorable 100
constituted only weak evidence of discrimination, plaintiffs would
necessarily have to combine the inference with anecdotal evidence
of employer bias to establish the prima facie case.299
2. The Employers' Opportunity to Respond with a
"Legitimate Explanation"
Where a plaintiff established a prima facie case using the inexo-
rable 100 inference, the employer would then have the
opportunity to show that it does not in fact operate through bias
factors. This element of the segregation framework is similar to the
business necessity defense in a disparate impact case or a legitimate
business reason in a disparate treatment claim. Here, an employer
could show that it has not restructured a particular job to attract a
Latino profile, or that it lacks sufficient power in the market to
control wage rates or conditions in ajob category.
If an employer is unable to provide a legitimate explanation for
the inexorable 100, the plaintiff would prevail on her claim. Sig-
nificantly, between the required proof of inexorability and the
employer's opportunity to provide an alternate explanation for an
inexorable 100, the framework proposed above provides ample
opportunity for employers to defend themselves in the face of an
inexorable 100 inference.
3. The Plaintiff's Response to Employer Defenses
If an employer provides a legitimate explanation, the plaintiff
will have one more opportunity to counter the employer's explana-
tion or, as in the disparate impact framework, demonstrate that a
less discriminatory alternative is feasible. One important employer
defense that will likely recur in the segregation framework is the
298. See Md. Troopers Ass'n v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1078-79 (4th Cir. 1993); Brown v.
Cost Co., No. Civ.A. 03-224 ERIE, 2006 WL 544296, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2006) ("Wfe do
not view Teamsters as necessarily eliminating a foundational requirement in a disparate
treatment case where there are no members of the plaintiff's protected class in the relevant
workforce. In fact, there was evidence in Teamsters that members of the plaintiffs' class were
available for work, had access to the job site, and were qualified.").
299. See Ortiz-Del Valle v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 42 F. Supp. 2d 334, 338 (S.D.N.Y 1999)
(finding evidence that no women were hired as basketball referees over a period of time,




interest defense, where an employer may argue that only a certain
group has an interest in the particular job. In an inexorable 100
case, however, the argument should be rejected once the plaintiff
shows that a particular employer policy or practice created a job
that no other group wants.
Employers might also respond that they structured ajob specifi-
cally to benefit a particular protected group.3°° The plaintiffs could
counter this argument in a segregation framework by presenting
alternatives that would confer similar benefits to the group, but
would not perpetuate segregation. Such a response protects
against segregation being a permanent condition within the com-
pany.
Finally, employers may attempt to attribute the conditions of the
undesirable job to market forces. The inexorable 100 inference
will allow plaintiffs to respond to this defense because it presumes
that even in a market-controlled environment a 100% job composi-
tion in a particular job category is unlikely. Moreover, plaintiffs can
bring forth evidence of particularly subordinating aspects of the
segregated job that could not be attributable to market pressures
to show that employer practices structured jobs to target a pro-
tected category of workers. Employers should not be able to
attribute particularly subordinating practices to market pressures.
4. The Remedy
In the end, the inexorable 100 serves a dual purpose. First, it will
require employers to explain the dynamics underlying the segre-
gated workplace. This enables plaintiffs to hold employers who
hire immigrants or brown collar workers because they do not want
to hire native born workers accountable, and allows workers the
opportunity to offer a counter-narrative that highlights a history
of subordination. Second, the inference will focus attention on
conditions within the segregated occupation and provide the
groundwork for a remedy that involves improving conditions in the
segregated position.
300. Under the current frameworks the employer argument that the segregation bene-
fits the plaintiff could end the discrimination inquiry. For example, in Woodson v. Pfizer, Inc.,
34 Fed. App'x 490, 492-93 (7th Cir. 2002), the Seventh Circuit faced the argument that a
company that targeted minority communities to sell its pharmaceuticals intentionally hired
African Americans exclusively as its sales agents. The African American who sued the com-
pany claimed that it engaged in a practice that amounted to the "flip side of the inexorable
zero." Id. at 492 (internal quotations omitted). The court dismissed the argument as illogical
based on the company's explicit goals of providing scholarships and job opportunities to
disadvantaged minorities. Id. at 493.
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An anti-discrimination framework that scrutinizes the conditions
of segregated workers invites a broader remedial scheme than one
traditionally found in employment discrimination cases. In addi-
tion to improving workplace conditions, remedies could include,
when appropriate, a more open immigration policy for those
workers who prove discrimination under a segregation framework.
The availability of visas and legalized status for workers who come
forward to complain about segregation would strengthen the posi-
tion of brown collar workers in the workplace. It would reduce the
vulnerabilities that make those workers attractive to employers in
the first place. The availability of such a remedy would recognize
that undocumented status engenders its own form of subordina-
tion for which employers should be responsible. Additionally, the
remedial scheme could formally require courts or law enforcement
officials to certify workers as discrimination victims and require
employers to pay the fees to navigate the immigration system. A
visa category could be created, similar to the existing U visa cate-
gory available now for certain crime victims.01
CONCLUSION
Policy-makers, social scientists, litigants, and courts must re-
evaluate the assumptions that underlie the jurisprudence and judi-
cial remedies in employment cases. Under current paradigms,
decision-makers assume that the remedy for the problem of segre-
gated workplaces lies in ordering the compensation, training, and
job placement opportunities that plaintiffs in protected groups
have been denied. In an evolving labor market, however, anti-
discrimination law must play a broader role. The segregated work-
place, still alive and thriving, now requires a new examination to
avoid the re-establishment of the conditions that Title VII meant to
eradicate. The time is right for the development and implementa-
tion of a segregation framework that can focus on improving
conditions in segregated jobs. The principle of broad remedial re-
lief in the Title VII context provides the foundation upon which a
court should be able to order changes in employment structures
that lead to the segregated workplace. Under a segregation frame-
work, a court need not limit relief to promotional opportunities or
relief that simply provides advancement opportunities to segrega-
tion victims. The inexorable 100 inference, like its predecessor, the
301. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(U)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)
(2000).
[VOL. 41:2
WINTER 2008] Addressing Segregation 505
inexorable zero inference, can bridge the gap in Title VII law as
the labor market and employment structures continue to evolve.
Without such an inference, segregation in the workplace and its
effects will remain a problem in anti-discrimination law.

